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EDITORIAL REPRINT from
J. MIDDLETON MURRY

Jesus and the Essenes

E. F. J. PAYNE

Some Aspects of Schopenhauer's Philosophy : I

G. SRINIVASAN

The Basis of Morality

BRIAN G. COOPER

John Amos Comenius (1592-1670)

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Advaita Vedānta : A Philosophical Reconstruction; *The Way of Power: A Practical Guide to the Tantric Mysticism of Tibet*; *The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation*; *Avatar and Incarnation*; *The Gītābhāṣya of Rāmānuja*; *Dickens 1970*

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THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XLI - NO. 7-8

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—however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XLI SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1970 No. 7–8

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

Jesus and the Essenes

[We reprint this article from THE ARYAN PATH, May 1931. As the original introduction said, Middleton Murry "writes that which will rejoice the hearts of all Theosophists and most progressive Christian thinkers."—ED.]

THE SUBSTANCE OF Mr. George Moore's novel, *The Brook Kerith,* is not entirely new. One hundred and fifty years ago Karl Friedrich Bahrdt had imagined that Jesus of Nazareth had emerged from the order of the Essenes to fulfil his mission and returned to it after a seeming death; he was followed by Venturini, whose *Natural History of the Great Prophet of Nazareth* (1800)—a remarkable book—is based on the supposition. After these came Salvator and Gfrörer, Nahor and Bosc. There is, in fact, a whole sequence of imaginative lives of Jesus based upon the hypothesis in which, to many readers, lay the originality of Mr. George Moore's novel.

Modern critical scholarship, as usual, frowns on the notion. We may take as characteristic the remark of Professor James Moffatt: "At one time ingenious attempts were made to trace the affinities of the Essenes with the early Christians . . . It is no longer necessary to prove that Jesus was not an Essene, and that early Christianity was not Essenic." One wonders how that negative proposition could be *proved.* But this peremptory assurance comes easy to some Biblical scholars, who would be pained and shocked if an equal rigour of negative scepticism were applied to their own religious assumptions. All that scholarship is entitled to affirm is that there is no definite evidence that Jesus was an Essene.

We may say, if we like, that the authors of the "fictitious" lives of Jesus, from Bahrdt to Moore, have been the victims of a wild imagination; but in matters of religion a wild imagination is better than no imagination at all. Imagination is always necessary if fact is to be transmuted into truth. Imagination may degenerate into mere fantasy; on the other hand, a certain measure of fantasy is necessary to the expression of imaginative truth. And

it seems to me that the soberest mind, reflecting on the actual facts, must be prepared to entertain the possibility, or even the probability, of a connection of some kind between Jesus and the Essenes.

The facts are these. First, that Jesus of Nazareth was one of the world's greatest religious and ethical teachers. If the word "spiritual master" means anything, he was one. Moreover, he was essentially a mystic, a teacher of the necessity of a mystical or spiritual "rebirth." In spiritual insight, in the perfection of his tolerance, he towered above the ordinary religious Jews of his time. Second, it so happened that at this particular moment in the world's history there was, in Palestine, a very astonishing order of religious Jews called the Essenes; there was also in Egypt, living among the low hills to the south of Lake Mareotis, an equally astonishing order of religious Jews called the Therapeutae. The evidence for the existence of these orders is incontrovertible; they are, in actual fact, better attested than the early Christians themselves. If we knew as much about the primitive Church as we do about the Essenes and the Therapeutae, half at least of the historical problems of Christianity would be solved out of hand. We insist again that it is at the precise moment of history when Jesus appeared that these two orders also appear.

It is to Philo, who was after Jesus, and perhaps a little, but very little, after Paul, the most remarkable Jew of his time, that we owe our main knowledge of these two orders. Philo commemorated them, because he so immensely admired and venerated them. Moreover, they justified his passionate belief in the possibility of Judaism rising to the level of a universal religion. He compares the Essenes to the Persian magi or the Indian gymnosophists; of the Therapeutae he says that "they are part of a movement which is known outside Egypt." To the Essenes, moreover, we have the testimony of the awe-struck Pliny: "Strange to say, the race has lasted for untold ages (*per milia saeculorum*) though no one is born within it." It is "a race more remarkable than any other in the wide world." Josephus, whose detailed account of the Essenes is very impressive, lived in their neighbourhood for three years as the *chela* of Banus the anchorite, who appears to have been at one time an Essene himself.

There is more than one distinction to be made between the Essenes and the Therapeutae; but it seems extravagant to deny that there must have been some close connection between them. The connection is probable on general grounds, seeing that both the orders were Jewish, and that the connection between Egypt and Palestine was intimate; the probability is heightened immeasurably when we consider that their doctrines were alike esoteric, and that both interpreted their sacred books—which certainly included more than the canonical scriptures—by allegory and symbolism; and it becomes a practical certainty when we find that Philo, to whom we owe our only account of the Therapeutae, describes the Essenes as the "therapeutae" of God. The associations of the particular word were well-known to him.

If we regard, as we must, Jesus of Nazareth as the great religious seeker

of his nation and his time, it is very difficult to believe that he was not, not merely conscious, but acutely aware, of the existence of these orders. Their observances and doctrines were far nearer to his own teaching than were those of the early Christian Church. The Essenes and the Therapeutae alike were far beyond the point at which an unseemly wrangle over the necessity of circumcision could convulse them. The Essenes repudiated sacrifice and the doctrine of sacrifice. (The doctrine of the sacrifice of Jesus himself as a propitiation for men's sins, one need not insist, is a crude posthumous invention that is utterly alien to the teaching of Jesus himself.) The Essenes practised the love that Jesus taught; their life, says Philo, "gives proofs of an indescribable bond of fellowship." They held that the master-slave relation was a violation of the order of Nature; they lived on terms of perfect amity and equality with one another, practising peaceful arts, and giving their earnings to a common store. There was, however, a hierarchy of rank among them, according to the length of years they had served in the order. They were an ascetic order; though Josephus tells us that there was a branch of them which did not eschew marriage: and we gather from Philo that for an Essene to have children was not exceptional. But on his entry into the strict order he said farewell to marriage. The order consisted in the main of mature men, though it was partly recruited by the adoption of chosen youths.

"It is no longer necessary to prove that Jesus was not an Essene." After the recital of these uncontroverted facts, Dr. Moffatt's words begin to bear a sense opposite to that which he intended. It is surely mere prejudice which would deny the high probability that Jesus was at least deeply influenced by this remarkable order. In this matter, at least, Madame Blavatsky's contentions in *Isis Unveiled* are far more reasonable than the unimaginative negations of dryasdust scholars who can never persuade themselves that Jesus was a human being at all. The truth is that he *could not* have been ignorant of the Essenes; and if there is such a thing as psychological probability, he must have been curious and eager about them, and he must have sought contact with them. They were, like himself, heretics among the Jews, and it is highly probable that their disappearance from the pages of history is due to an outburst of that frenzied Jewish fanaticism which was so grimly punished by Titus.

Nor would it have been difficult for Jesus to make contact with them. Relatively, the Essenes were numerous. They numbered 4000, while of the Pharisees themselves there were only 6000. There were two Essenes to every three Pharisees in Judaea. And though it is probable that the majority of the Essenes lived in desert communities, the testimony of Josephus is quite definite that "large numbers of them inhabit every city." These city communities were well organized; each had "a special relieving-officer for strangers," whose business it was to provide the wanderer with food and shelter. Again, the reasonable supposition is that it would have been impossible for Jesus to avoid coming into contact with them.

To leave aside for the moment the question of their actual doctrines,

the reader of the accounts in Philo and Josephus is impressed by two distinct characteristics in their practices. On the one hand the emphasis of their daily ritual was upon purification. Thus the novice, on entering the order, was given "a sort of spade." No doubt this tool served many purposes, and was in some sort a symbol of their social activity, but the purpose on which Josephus insists was that the Essene used it for digging a hole into which he eased himself; afterwards he performed a ritual ablution. The Essenes partook of a ceremonial midday meal and supper together, for which they clad themselves in white linen robes. Every day they bathed themselves in water, and the crucial stages in the progress of the novice (who had to serve one year's probation, then a further period of two years, before he became a full member of the order) were marked by a ritual bathing. On the other hand, though the emphasis on purification was so great, the Essenes did not withdraw from society. They worked at their various crafts among ordinary men, and received their wages, which they paid into the common store. They were not contemplative anchorites, but practical mystics who acknowledged their social obligations. Hence it is not surprising, as Josephus says, that they did not "repudiate marriage with its function of carrying on the race," or that there was a branch of the order which was composed of men still living with their wives. The majority of the Essenes appear to have been men who had got "beyond marriage," rather than men in principle opposed to it.

For their actual doctrine, which was obviously esoteric, we have to rely on a few words of Josephus, and certain unavoidable implications. Josephus says that they believed in the eternality of the human soul, which they regarded as being in bondage to the flesh. He also says that the novice, on being finally received in to the order, "swears to communicate their principles precisely as he himself received them . . . and to preserve with like care the sacred books of the society and the names of the angels." The "names of the angels" powerfully suggests the Gnostic belief in the successive emanation from the eternal and uncreated Godhead, of *Nous,* of *Logos,* of the divine Intelligences (or Angels) , and of the Sophia (or Wisdom of God) . That their doctrines were Gnostic is borne out by Philo's admiration of the Essenes, and by the evidence that the greater part of their lore was symbolic. Probably, like the Therapeutae, they used the Jewish scriptures simply as matter for allegorical interpretation. Again the total repudiation of sacrifice, by which they separated themselves as absolutely from contemporary Judaism as a modern Catholic would separate himself from his Church by repudiating the Mass, suggests forcibly that their doctrines were truly spiritual. Their ceremonial, in turn, suggests that they had a profound belief in the doctrine of "the eternal rebirth of the soul" which, in one form or another, has always been central to mysticism. That their "newness of life" was real and striking is beyond all doubt.

Did such an order spring up spontaneously in the heart of Judaism? It is possible. Ultimately the doctrines of all truly spiritual religions are the same, and the spontaneous generation of a universal spiritual wisdom

would only be another witness to the fundamental identity of the human soul. At the same time, although it is possible that the Essenes represented a completely independent movement, it is not probable. The Roman province of Syria, of which Judaea was a part, was the destined place of meeting between the religious ideas of the East and West. It seems to me highly probable that the Essenes owed their very distinctive character to the influence of Buddhism; and further that Madame Blavatsky was well within the bounds of historical probability when she maintained that, through the Essenes, Jesus himself was deeply influenced in his ethical and spiritual teaching by some of the purest spiritual doctrines of the East.

As a matter of "scientific" history—if true history can ever be really "scientific"—the supposition is not necessary. But the sheer historical probability of the influence is great, greater far than the ordinary Biblical scholar will admit. Whether we shall turn a high probability into a certainty depends, not on the facts themselves which are so few that they offer no resistance to an imaginative interpretation, but rather on our temper and purposes. Madame Blavatsky's temper and purposes were such that in this matter she was a better historian than the academic sceptics. She had deep religious experience, and a great power of imaginative sympathy; and she knew for a fact that all high religions are in essence identical. *And that is a fact.* She also knew that the human soul, in its own religious progress, eagerly seeks out sustenance for itself and corroboration of its own experience wherever it can find it; and naturally she could not believe that Jesus of Nazareth was any exception to the rule. Whether he was actually taught as a boy by the Essenes, as Mr. George Moore, following Venturini, imagines, or whether when his own religious experience became more definite he sought for confirmation of it among them—such a question is of course beyond our decision. But that the influence of the purest religion of the East was there among the Essenes, that Jesus would naturally have sought to avail himself of it, and that he did avail himself of it—these are probabilities with a better title to be called certainties than a good many articles of the Christian faith.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

When men are rightly occupied, their amusement grows out of their work, as the colour petals out of a fruitful flower; when they are faithfully helpful and compassionate, all their emotions are steady, deep, perpetual and vivifying to the soul as is the natural pulse to the body.

—JOHN RUSKIN

E. F. J. PAYNE

Some Aspects of Schopenhauer's Philosophy

[We are glad to welcome Lt. Col. E. F. J. Payne to our pages. A Buddhist for over sixty years, he was struck some forty years back by the many points in common between the Buddhist philosophy and that of Schopenhauer, and to the study and translation of Schopenhauer's writings, to make them better known, he has dedicated his efforts for many years. He is Honorary Secretary of the Schopenhauer Society.

His translation (in two volumes) of *The World as Will and Representation* was published in U.S.A., 1958. (The usual title *The World as Will and Idea* given to the book in English is, he says, a mistranslation. The word "Idea" does not render Schopenhauer's term "*Vorstellung*" correctly.) This translation was later issued as a two-volume paperback (Dover Publications, N.Y., 1966, reprinted 1970). His translation of Schopenhauer's *Basis of Morality* appeared in 1965 (Bobbs-Merril, Liberal Arts series). The Open Court Publishing Co. will be publishing his translations of *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,* and *On the Will in Nature.* He has also translated other German writers on Oriental philosophy—Helmuth von Glasenapp, Georg Grimm, Paul Dahlke—and is at present at work on the major task of translating Schopenhauer's four-volume *Handschriftlichen Nachlass.*

We print below the first part of his long paper.—ED.]

I

SCHOPENHAUER himself has stated that he started where Kant (1724-1804) left off, and that he used Kant's philosophy as the basis of his own. In 1781 at the age of fifty-seven Immanuel Kant wrote his epoch-making *Critique of Pure Reason,* in which he propounded the fundamental question of all philosophy—WHAT IS THE WORLD? Thus he distinguished the WHAT of the world from the world itself, regarding this as the phenomenal appearance of an inner inscrutable something. In itself this something, this essence, does not appear, and no progress on the path of the empirical sciences can ever reach it.

Space is infinite in all directions, time is infinite into the past and future, and the chain of causality is without beginning or end, inasmuch as no event can occur at any time without proceeding as an effect from its adequate cause. Every phenomenon, every event, every change in the world, occurs in space and time, and is the effect of a previous cause. Space, time, and causality, however, are not properties inherent in the objects we perceive. On the contrary, they are our way of experiencing the external world. They are, in fact, the three functions of our intellect which enable it to experience an objective world at all. They are *a priori* elements inasmuch as they pre-exist as the innate forms of our intellect, and are thus *prior* to all possible and conceivable experience. What we know through our space-time-causality–conditioned intellect is simply a world of phenomenal appearances,

and the ultimate reality or essence behind all these was called by Kant the thing-in-itself. As this lies outside the forms of our intellect (and hence outside space, time, causality), Kant gave it up as unknowable.

In his essay on the theory of knowledge which he first published in 1813 at the age of twenty-five, Schopenhauer shows that our five senses furnish us with meagre data and that, automatically and in a flash, the apparatus in our skull elaborates these data into the conscious perception of an external world in all its bewildering wealth of detail. Thus the material world, extended in space and time, is as such known to us only through our intellect. But by its very nature such an intellect can never furnish us with anything but mental pictures; and so the whole world including our own body is nothing more than our own mental picture of it, in so far as such a world is regarded through the intellect.

But as our mental picture, the world is only the *form* in which things *appear* to us. Kant's thing-in-itself, whatever this may be, is presented to our eyes as the universe extended in space and time and flowing past us on the endless chain of causes and effects. However far we go by the clue of causality in any direction through infinite space and time, we arrive only at that which is *in nature,* never at that which, so to speak, lies *behind* nature. Thus wherever we go in the universe, we are for ever restricted to the physical and are never able to reach the metaphysical.

The natural sciences show us the world as a totality of matter constantly changing its qualities, forms, and states. All such changes are effects of causes, and are nothing but the varied manifestations in space, time, and causality of that which does not exist in space, time, causality, and which is therefore unknowable. The scientist calls this unknowable essence a *force of nature*; he can only indicate *how* such a force manifests itself, that is to say in what form of space, in what sequence of time, and under what causal conditions it appears. He does not know *what* such a force may be *in itself,* for it does not exist in space and time, nor can it be found by means of causality. Thus the same inscrutable essence, sought by philosophy as the principle of the world, is what Kant calls the thing-in-itself and the scientist calls a force, and is given up by both as unknowable.

Nevertheless, philosophy has to explain the world from this principle, this force, this thing-in-itself. Now all explanation is the deriving of the unknown from the known, and so, if the problem is not absolutely insoluble, there must be a point from which this mysterious thing-in-itself is not only accessible, but is even more intimately known than is the entire phenomenal world which is to be explained from it. There is, indeed, such a point.

As long as we perceive through our space-time-causality–conditioned intellect, a knowledge of the thing-in-itself is, according to Kant, for ever impossible. But our outwardly directed intellect is not the only way in which we can arrive at things. More intimately known to us than the whole world is our intellect in and through which all the world's phenomena are presented to us. Yet even better known to us than this intellect is our own self, and it is here if anywhere, that the key must be found which opens the

door to an inner understanding of nature. A man can comprehend his own self *from without* like any other object, and *from within* unlike any other object, and in this case he recognizes that the true essence of his inner nature is *will.*

When Schopenhauer uses the word *will,* he implies something more than the conscious control of one's own faculty of reason over the claims of desire, or mere intentions, resolutions, or decisions. On the contrary, *will* is for him that which is more intimately known than anything else and which, therefore, cannot be explained by anything else. It underlies all our emotions, all desiring, striving, longing, craving, hoping, loving, hating, grieving, shunning, and so forth. Schopenhauer shows that it is one and the same force that appears in the voluntary and conscious movements of our limbs or in the involuntary and unconscious processes of digestion, circulation, secretion, and so on.

By a very convincing analogy, it is clear that everyone must be aware of himself as an embodiment of will; and why stop at human beings? Animals too are manifestations of will, for the fundamental difference between them and us is only in the degree of intellect or brain. But the intellect appertains to the *form* of appearance, not to the metaphysical entity that appears through this form. However varied the different animal species, they are identical as regards what they fundamentally *will.*

The will, whereof every living thing is the embodiment, is originally and essentially *unconscious,* and only in a limited sphere of animal life, becoming more limited as we descend the scale, is the will furnished with a consciousness or brain. The secondary nature of all conscious life is seen in the necessity for sleep where the union between will and intellect is suspended and the latter lapses into unconsciousness. Thus the analysis of the so-called psyche, formerly regarded as one and indivisible, into will and intellect is another outstanding feature of Schopenhauer's philosophy in which he stresses the primary and basic nature of the will and the secondary nature of the intellect.

Schopenhauer goes on to elaborate the discussion and to show that the organic forces controlling animal and vegetable phenomena, and the inorganic forces manifesting themselves in inanimate nature are ultimately and fundamentally the same metaphysical reality that is called *will.* The truth of this dawns on us when we see how inorganic forces act and react, how eagerly certain substances enter into chemical combination, and with what vehemence two electric poles strive for union.

Schopenhauer's will is what the Buddhists call *tanha* (Sanskrit, *trishna*), which means thirst, craving, hunger, excitement, the fever of unsatisfied longing. It is in the entire universe the only thing without a cause, for we cannot ask how desire came into existence, since the very essence of desire is spontaneity. It is thus without a cause and also without a beginning in time. If it were completely satisfied, it would cease to be desire, for its very nature is to go on desiring. Thus it at once seeks and shuns satisfaction, the former since this constitutes its whole essence, and the latter since satisfaction

would extinguish it. And so the self-contradictory nature of desire is revealed; but it shows a want of reflection on the part of those who infer from this that Schopenhauer's philosophy is self-contradictory. In all its parts this philosophy is a faithful reflection of the nature of things and it is as little self-contradictory as is nature herself. Yet in nature, as well as in Schopenhauer's system based thereon, a general antinomy can be observed, in consequence of which man is seen to be at the same time mortal and immortal, not-free and free, that is to say phenomenon and thing-in-itself. Moreover, it was Goethe who said to Eckermann: *"aber der Widerspruch ist es, der uns produktiv macht."*

As regards individual existence, two ways are open to the will, namely the *willing* of such an existence, the affirmation of the will-to-live, and the *not-willing* of such an existence, the denial of the will-to-live. As such denial lies outside the domain of the physical world and thus outside space, time, and causality, it is almost inconceivable, and yet it is seen to break through this world of assertion in self-denying altruism, which is for this very reason at variance with the natural order of things, and which shines like the light of another and better world that passeth our understanding.

This empirical world is the stage for the assertion of the will, and all evil and wickedness with which the world abounds necessarily spring from egoism, from this fundamental form of the will's assertion. And so a salvation from moral and physical evil is possible only through a complete transformation of our true nature in a change of our will. In this change the real moral goal and ultimate aim of existence are recognized in accordance with the basic teachings of New Testament Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism.

E. F. J. PAYNE

(*To be concluded*)

Plato and Music

Plato knew what music does:
How it gives to us true leavening of spirit's longing
And unerringly fills our mind's wish.
Although we know that Plato rightly taught us music's craft
We like children play with the precious tones,
Perverse, self-willed, forgetting we are pupils now.
But Plato is our patient prophet still
And prepares to speak again.

—MARY CARMAN ROSE

G. SRINIVASAN

The Basis of Morality

[Dr. G. Srinivasan, Reader in Philosophy, University of Mysore, is well known to our readers. His lucid inquiry into the various grounds of ethical action is balanced, and culminates in the relation of morals to mysticism. —ED.]

THE QUESTION "Why should I be moral?" is a simple one and almost everyone has a ready answer to it. The real difficulty arises when one begins to examine these answers critically. The question itself cannot, however, be dismissed as an impertinent one unless an answer is already assumed for it dogmatically—since any reflective and purposive being has a legitimate tendency to ask it and a right to examine the answer. Enquiry into the meaning of morality is, in fact, as old as Plato in the West, and we find an interesting discussion of it in his Dialogues. Since then, philosophers, theologians, and moralists have concerned themselves with this problem and sought to establish a basis for morality in their respective systems. But there has been no uniformity in their approach to this problem: the approaches have been of different kinds and from different standpoints.

At the outset we may briefly consider what is familiarly known as the Kantian approach to this problem. Immanuel Kant, in his *Critique of Practical Reason,* has pointed out that moral goodness is an intrinsic value, an "ought" or a "categorical imperative" which must be pursued for its own sake without any expectation of results. Among the Indian philosophers, Prabhakara the Mimamsaka takes a similar attitude and argues that man, being distinct from other animals, is capable of practising *dharma* for its own sake and that to say he must follow it for the sake of results would belittle the dignity of man.[1]

According to these philosophers, the very question, "Why should I be moral?" in so far as it means to ask about the results of being virtuous, turns out to be irrelevant and "undignified." They have absolute faith in man's strength of mind to be virtuous at all costs without minding the results, and this faith is perhaps a mark of their own personal integrity. But their view is psychologically unsound, for man after all is a purposive being and he can hardly be expected to follow the path of virtue for its own sake when the contrary path seems most conducive to his self-interest. The Kantian view of morality thus suffers from too much of formal rigidity and does violence to the psychological truth of human purposiveness in morality.

Another approach to the problem of morality is what we find in the religions of the world. The religious approach to this problem consists in the belief that death is not the end of human existence but that there is a spiritual aspect in man which survives death and continues to experience the results of his acts either in a heaven or a hell—if not in this very world

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1 M. HIRIYANNA: *The Quest after Perfection* (Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1952), p. 106

in a different birth—and hence it is the part of wisdom for man to do only such "good" acts as would ensure his heavenly happiness and prevent his damnation to hell. This religious attitude can, no doubt, have a deep influence on the ethical life of man as long as he believes in the religious doctrines. But religion may sometimes lose its hold on human consciousness and man may question the validity of its doctrines, in which case such religion can hardly satisfy his sceptical mind, since its ultimate appeal is more to faith than to logical thinking.

There have been many thinkers who, being aware of the unsatisfactoriness of the religious approach to the problem of morality, have sought to plead for morality purely within a human setting. This can be called the humanistic approach for purposes of analysis. The ethics of Bentham and Mill, familiarly known as Utilitarianism, show an approach of this kind. They point out that whatever act leads to the happiness of the maximum number of people in a society must be regarded as good, and that, when the society as a whole prospers because of such acts, the individual in that society also prospers. The chief drawback of this view is that it seeks to measure moral goodness in terms of quantity or number and ignores its qualitative aspect.

Karl Marx carries the logic of the humanistic approach to morality to its limits in his Dialectical Materialism. Highly critical of religious doctrines, he announces that religion is a mass illusion, an "opium of the masses" administered as an antidote to man's sense of frustration born of the existing conditions of his society such as poverty and inequality. Man is not immoral by birth, but these conditions make him immoral, and any religious teaching which promises him future or other-worldly compensation for his present suffering proves to be too feeble to keep him moral against the pressure of his social conditions. But if social evils such as poverty and inequality are eradicated, and if man is properly educated so as to understand his responsibility for the society, then there will be no need for religion[2] and man will naturally be moral without any external coercion or inducement.

Sartre also seeks to base morality on atheistic and "non-spiritual" grounds in his *Existentialism*. His phenomenological analysis of human existence leaves no room for the acceptance of a soul or spiritual substance and makes the concept of God a self-contradiction. Human existence is contingent, begins with birth and ends in death, and there is no soul or God *prior* to it. In fact, to admit the reality of a soul or God implies the priority of essence over existence and denies human freedom; with the denial of freedom there will be no morality in the real sense of the term and the result will be determinism. Hence Sartre argues that, if man is to be morally free, the reality of a soul or God must be denied and man must

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2 "The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about its conditions is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions."—MARX and ENGELS: *On Religion* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow. 1957)

be conceived as the principle of "nothingness" with no inner essence in him. It is because of this inherent "nothingness" that he is "free" to "create" values, of which the moral value is an important one. To be true to his own existence, man must be moral since morality is consistent with his inherent "nothingness" whereas immorality is inconsistent with it and hence an "error." Sartre also points out that man's ethical freedom in a society depends on the freedom of others and hence in desiring to have his own freedom he must recognize the freedom of others as well;[3] he must always act in such a manner that others could imitate him without any evil consequence following therefrom.[4] He must thus be fully aware of his own freedom and responsibility to others and should "create" such values as would be beneficial to the whole of mankind. This is his "authentic" human existence, which is its own reward, and it will be foolish to look forward to any spiritual reward after death. Sartre thus pleads for the necessity of morality within the context of human contingency and finiteness.

The views of Marx and Sartre may fail to carry conviction to many; for, in the first place, it is hard to agree with the Marxist analysis of religion that it is entirely a product of social conditions and will disappear if these conditions are suitably changed. Religious faith is, in fact, the result of man's reaction to the *general* limitations of his human existence such as finiteness and death, which can neither be removed nor changed, and hence has deep psychological roots in him; man has a psychological craving for religious faith which is as natural to him as his biological craving for the satisfaction of his physical needs. Scepticism or atheism is an "exceptional" phenomenon in the history of man and is not a general trait of human existence. Secondly, if there is nothing for man after death, and if he can be happy without caring for others during life, why should he not prefer this path of immorality to morality? This is a question which can hardly be answered strictly within the limits of the philosophy of human finiteness as propounded by Sartre. In fact, Sartre himself sees this difficulty and tries to answer it by saying that a man who acts in a manner conducive to his own interests without caring for the interests of others suffers from an "uneasy conscience."[5]

This brings us to another approach to the problem of morality, which may be called the sentimentalist approach. This is closely linked with the humanistic approach discussed above but is more natural and less sophisticated than that. The sentimentalist approach uses conscience as the key to the problem of morality. But conscience is a most controversial and yet a most familiar concept. The supporters of conscience claim that the inner voice of conscience is always clear, absolute, and universal, and is hence

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3 "Of course, freedom as the definition of man does not depend on others, but as soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom."
—Jean-Paul Sartre: *Existentialism* (Philosophical Library, New York. 1947), p. 54

4 *Ibid.*, p. 22

5 *Ibid.*

an indispensable and unfailing guide in matters of morality where reason seems to be of no avail; reason can at best distinguish between the right and the wrong, but the "moral impetus" to follow the right and reject the wrong can come only from the operation of conscience. The critics of conscience, on the other hand, argue that conscience, being a product of one's own education and social environments, is relative and changing, and hence cannot be a trustworthy guide in matters of morality. This point is difficult to decide, the more so because conscience is internal or subjective and does not lend itself completely to objective means of analysis.

One point, however, is clear. The critics of conscience often fail to distinguish between conscience and prejudice, and the strength of their argument seems to be based on the lack of this distinction. But conscience and prejudice *are* distinct, in fact so distinct that sometimes conscience seems to resist the influence of all prejudices. Prejudice has an external source such as education, social environment, custom, religion, etc., and accordingly we have several prejudices such as the class prejudice, the colour prejudice, religious prejudice and so on; these prejudices differ from people to people and they divide people. But conscience has an internal source inasmuch as it is born of imagination; man has a capacity to imagine himself in the place of another, and this imagination is the source of his conscience or "inner voice" with regard to what he should do to the "other" man. The immediate result of the operation of conscience is a felt sympathy for the "other" man and it will be followed by suitable modes of ethical action. Imagination is thus the seat of conscience and sympathy for the "right" cause is its invariable result.[6] Moreover, imagination, though subjective, is yet common to all individuals and hence conscience which is born of it serves to unite them in spite of their dividing prejudices. But the chief drawback of the sentimentalist view which makes conscience the basis of morality is that it does not provide any purpose or goal to the conscientious activity of man beyond the *momentary* emotive satisfaction he derives from it.

This defect is overcome in the mystic approach to the problem of morality. It is, in a sense, an integral approach since it includes the merits of the other approaches while excluding their defects. The mystic is not committed to the religious dogmatism which regards realities like soul or God as waiting to be realized after death, nor is he committed to the materialistic scepticism which confines human existence to the physical level of being. His is an experimental attitude to life, and for him God and Soul are "experiential" and spiritual realities to be realized in the creative dynamism of his own being. He accepts different levels of human existence —the physical and the spiritual—and morality for him[7] is the means of

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6 Shelley remarks in his *Defence of Poetry*: "A man to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others: the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by action upon the cause."

7 We are not referring here to those mystics who withdraw from the world or renounce it but those who participate in moral activity providing it with an "inner" spiritual orientation.

"transcendence" from the physical to the spiritual. For morality, being an act of self-sacrifice, enables him to overcome his egoistic impulses and makes him more and more aware of a deeper level of peaceful and delightful spiritual being in himself. The delight which he thus discovers in himself justifies the sacrifice and suffering which he voluntarily accepts in his moral striving, and he will not be in need of any other reward or inducement.

This view is well emphasized in Indian philosophy. The superiority of morality over ritualism is recognized[8] and *dharma,* in its comprehensive sense, is said to include both social virtues and virtues of self-discipline.[9] *Dharma* is, in fact, the central concept in the Indian theory of values and it is regarded not only as regulative of *artha* and *kama* but also as a means to *moksha.*

G. SRINIVASAN

Unhappy is the man or the nation which, when the divine moment arrives, is found sleeping or unprepared to use it, because the lamp has not been kept trimmed for the welcome and the ears are sealed to the call. But thrice woe to them who are strong and ready, yet waste the force or misuse the moment; for them is irreparable loss or a great destruction.

In the hour of God cleanse thy soul of all self-deceit and hypocrisy and vain self-flattering, that thou mayst look straight into thy spirit and hear that which summons it. All insincerity of nature, once thy defence against the eye of the Master and the light of the ideal, becomes now a gap in thy armour and invites the blow. Even if thou conquer for the moment, it is the worse for thee, for the blow shall come afterwards and cast thee down in the midst of thy triumph. But being pure, cast aside all fear; for the hour is often terrible, a fire and a whirlwind and a tempest, a treading of the winepress of the wrath of God; but he who can stand up in it on the truth of his purpose is he who shall stand; even though he fall, he shall rise again; even though he seem to pass on the wings of the wind, he shall return. Nor let worldly prudence whisper too closely in thy ear: for it is the hour of the unexpected.

—SHRI–AUROBINDO

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8 The *Mahabharata* declares: "Speaking the truth is far better than celebrating many horse-sacrifices." Please see M. HIRIYANNA: *op. cit.,* p. 103.

9 M. HIRIYANNA: *op. cit.,* p. 104.

K. E. PARTHASARATHY

The Philosophical Bases of *Bhakti*

[We print below the second and concluding part of this long survey by Shri K. E. Parthasarathy.—ED.]

II

A PROMINENT PLACE has been given to *bhakti* by the three prominent schools of thought—Advaita, Vishishtadvaita, and Dvaita. They have recognized the soul's inherent and natural relationship with the Divine. In Advaita the individual soul is viewed as identical with *Brahman*. In Vishishtadvaita, the soul is viewed as God's body or *sharira*. In Dvaita, the soul, though independent in essence, is absolutely dependent on God for existence. There are also other views, such as the *Bhedabheda* (identity and difference), *acintya-bhedabheda* (unthinkable identity-difference), etc. Some have attempted to reconcile these views by proposing a gradational approach. The *dasa-bhava* (servanthood) leads to the soul-as-*sharira bhava* of Vishishtadvaita and to the *aikya-bhava* (identity) of Advaita. As the *Isha Upanishad* points out (6-7), though the soul is different from God, it can and does experience the Divine as in oneself and oneself as of the Divine. There is no doubt that all the three schools of thought recognize the soul's inherent, natural relationship with the Divine. The *Brahman* is One only; all the rest belong to Him, are part of Him, and are in a deep sense one with Him. The soul is His.

God and the souls have in common consciousness, and love is a matter of conscious self-giving to Him, whom one feels as one's absolute need and support. This relation between the soul and God is essential to the experience of devotion. The fact that the soul is involved in *Prakriti* reveals another factor. The soul is trying to escape from *Prakriti* or Nature in order to unite itself with God. *Bhakti* accelerates the process. This relationship to God is natural to the soul, whereas alienation from the Deity is unnatural and the cause of all misery. Union with God secures *swarupa* or its true status to the soul.

There is another conception which accelerates the progress of *bhakti* towards God, viz. *sheshatva* or servanthood. The individual soul has one *sheshi* (master) on whom it depends. "The *shesha* is that which exists for another," says the *Purva Mimamsa* (III. 1.2) That another is God and God alone in the context of the *swarupa* of the soul. Dependence on beings other than the Supreme is always painful at one stage or another because they are not *sheshis* for whose purposes the soul exists. It is only when the soul realizes this relation and its intricate nature that devotion as a *rasa* has possibility of arising and progressing without let or hindrance.

The practice of *bhakti* requires elaborate disciplines which include not only the sublimation of feeling but also the training of the intellect and the will. In Vishishtadvaita, they are known as the *sadhana saptaka* or the seven-

fold moral and spiritual discipline, which includes *viveka* or discrimination; *vimoksha* or freedom from all else than God; *abhyasa* or continuous thinking of God, *kriya,* or doing good to others; *kalyana* or wishing well to all; *satyam* or truthfulness; *arjavam* or integrity; *daya* or compassion; *ahimsa* or non-violence; *dana* or charity; and *anavasada* or cheerfulness and hope. *Bhakti* is knowledge of God as well the obedience to His will. It is loving God with all mind and with all heart. It finds its culmination in an intuitive realization of God.

Bhakti according to Shankara, contemplates the triple discipline of thought, feeling, and will termed *viveka; vairagya;* the disciplines of *sama* or tranquillity, restraint (*dama*), renunciation (*uparati*), resignation (*titiksha*), concentration (*samadhi*), and steadfastness of mind (*shraddha*); and, lastly, an intense desire for freedom. According to Shankara, true *bhakti* is a seeking after one's own real nature (*svarupanusandhanam*). The truth is *ekam* or only one, viz. the realization of the *Atman.* Until one recognizes the oneness of the self with the Reality, one shall revolve in the circle of *samsara.* From his philosophical point of view, though the Absolute is visualized in many ways, the underlying Reality is the same. He has shown his sincerity of his conviction by his soul-stirring hymns to different deities and has helped the masses to interpret God in terms of spiritual value.

Shankara has recognized the dual experience in its most *sattvika* form as a preliminary to the non-dual experience. According to the exposition of *bhakti* given in one of his famous verses, *bhakti* is like the movement of the seeds of the *ankola* tree falling to the ground towards the trunk of the tree, sticking there. It is like the attraction of iron filings to the magnet. Further, it resembles the unceasing love of a woman to her husband. It is like the entwining of a creeper round a tree. It is like the spontaneous coursing of the river to the ocean. Evidently, each of the analogies refers to a form of *bhakti.* The series is a graded one. Each of the lower forms leads to a higher, till the devotee identifies himself with the Supreme. Madhusudana Sarasvati, the greatest of the Advaita thinkers after Shankara and an ardent devotee of God in the form of Krishna, has made valuable and immortal contributions to the doctrine of *bhakti.* He has left us a treatise on devotion called *Bhagavad-bhakti-rasayana* in which he expounds *bhakti* as a *rasa.* According to him *bhakti* is the *citta* (consciousness) taking the form of the Lord. The *citta* or *Antahkarana* takes the form of the object it comes into contact with. According to him the *alambana* (basis) of *bhakti* is God. The *rasa* realized, *Paramananda* or Supreme Bliss, is God, and the mind which has taken God's form is also God. To Madhusudana Sarasvati, *Bhakti Rasa* is the real *rasa.* According to Madhusudana, there are two types of *bhakti*: one is the actual process of being in love with God; the other the goal itself, the everlasting experience of *Brahman* and its Bliss.

According to Ramanuja, *bhakti* is the unitive way in which the aspirant sheds his egoism and attunes himself to the will of God and yearns for eternal communion with Him. It is the consummation of moral and spiritual culture. It is the direct way to perfection as it leads to the very heart of

divine consciousness. Ramanuja speaks of *bhakti* as a form of knowledge. He opens his commentary on the *Brahma Sutras* thus:

> May my *buddhi* or *jnana* blossom into *bhakti* or devotion to Brahman or Srinivasa whose nature is revealed in the Upanishad, as the Self, that out of the *lila* or sport of love, creates, sustains, and re-absorbs the whole universe with a view to saving the *jivas* that seek His love.

This itself strikes the keynote of Vishishtadvaita and its doctrine of *bhakti*. Brahman as the *sharirin* of the *jiva* is the endeavour as well as the end and the discipline of *sadhana saptaka* (seven-fold *sadhana*) is helpful in building *bhakti*. Vishishtadvaita expounds the theory of *bhaktirupapanna jnana* or *jnana* turned into *bhakti*.

Bhakti that is not manifested in work and worship of the Divine is not real integral *bhakti*. As the *Ishavasya Upanishad* states, it is such *karmas* as are performed with the knowledge that all is of the Lord, pervaded by the Lord, and belongs to him alone, that will accelerate *bhakti*. Such work is called *nishkama karma* by Krishna in *Bhagavad-Gita*. Such *nishkama karma* leaves the individual free from all the fruits and results of action and helps to cross over the barriers of *samsara* and its inherent ills. Thus *bhakti* is a strenuous path which can be full-fledged only when it is integrated with knowledge of God, of oneself, as one is and as one ought to be, and with *nishkama karma* as God's work.

In Dwaita philosophy, *bhakti* is the deepest attachment to the Lord, deep-rooted in a clear understanding of His greatness and majesty.

> It is the steady and continuous flow of deep attachment to God, impregnable to any number of impediments, transcending the love of our own selves, our kith and kin, cherished belongings, etc., and fortified by a firm conviction of the transcendent majesty and greatness of God as the abode of all perfections and free from all blemish and by an unshakable conviction of the complete metaphysical dependence of everything else upon God.

According to Madhva, it is the outcome of patient study and deep reflection. He also demands a high degree of moral perfection on the part of the *bhakta*. He affirms that there can be no true devotion to God without a real sense of moral purity, sincerity of purpose, and detachment from worldly pleasures. Madhva has recognized that *bhakti* is in essence an ineffable blending of the emotion and the intellect. He has given expression to the intensity of his love of God in its sublime and rapturous aspects in the benedictory and concluding portions of his works. Madhva views sublime *bhakti* not as a means to an end but as an end in itself. The relation between the individual and the Supreme is not something that is snapped in release. It is a sacred relation that holds good for ever. *Bhakti* is also considered as a blend of knowledge and love. *Jnana* is a constituent of *bhakti*. Consequently, the latter is often referred to as *jnana* itself, and *vice versa*.

In the process of devotion, Grace plays a vital role and this has been recognized by almost all the systems of thought.

> This *Atman* cannot be attained through study or intelligence or much learning—whom it wishes to attain by him it can be attained. To him the *Atman* reveals its true nature. (*Mundaka,* III. 2-3 and *Katha,* II. 23)

The *Gita* takes its cue from the Upanishads and lays stress on divine Grace. It tells us that Arjuna enjoyed the Vision of the *Vishvarupa* by the Grace of the Lord (XI. 47), that one wins the eternal abode by His Grace (XVIII. 51), and that one crosses over all difficulties through His Grace (XVIII. 58). To Ramanuja, Grace is the culminating result of the threefold process of *karma, jnana,* and *bhakti,* which involves a training of body, intellect, and will. Grace removes the ostacles in the path of devotion caused by past sins and generates devotion to Him. According to Ramanuja, Grace operates in accordance with the Law of Karma. It is divine Grace that plays the most decisive role in the final deliverance of the souls, according to Madhva. It is only the Grace of God that can reveal the true nature of God to the individual soul. Madhva affirms that no-one can be saved by the sheer force of knowledge. Devotion to God should have the nature of clinging to Him firmly at all costs so as to evoke His Grace.

The longing for God is well illustrated in the episode of Nachiketas in the Upanishads. Nachiketas wanted only one boon: the knowledge of the *Atman* (*Katha,* I. 23-24). In the famous dialogue between the sage Yajnavalkya and his wife Maitreyi in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad,* the sage points out to his wife: "The husband is not dear on account of the husband but on account of the Atman as the Highest Self." It is by seeking the Infinite we get infinite satisfaction and *ananda.* Human love is to be treated as an expression of divine love. The glory of such rare flowers of humanity can be well realized when one keeps in mind what Lord Krishna says in the *Gita* again and again: "I am in my *bhakta* and he is in Me" (IX. 29). "I bear all the burden of my devotees' concerns" (IX. 22). "Place thy heart on Me, O Arjuna, and discover Me by thus understanding, and thou shalt without doubt hereafter enter into Me" (XII. 8).

In the course of a soul's journey towards the ultimate goal, few events are more momentous and epoch-making than the springing up of strong *bhakti* or devotion. A true *bhakta* is a true *jnani,* as he knows that God alone is the source and satisfaction of life (*Gita,* VII. 19). So he lives and has his being in the divine love. The Lord of love seeks the *jnani* and sees him as His very life and self (*Gita,* VI. 17, 18).

K. E. PARTHASARATHY

The Mystic Bird

A novel cage with nine doors
And there the bird was kept.
It is strange that it stayed there
Why wonder when it left?

Trs. from Sanskrit by
—SUJITKUMAR MUKHOPADHYAYA

BRIAN G. COOPER

John Amos Comenius (1592-1670)

[Mr. Brian G. Cooper is a frequent contributor to our pages. In this article he introduces readers to the outline of the life and work of John Amos Comenius, the three-hundredth anniversary of whose death fell this year. Readers will notice in the "Ends and Sayings" for this month that the educational ideas of Comenius are still referred to and discussed by thoughtful educationists. —ED.]

THE TERCENTARY of the death of John Amos Comenius (1592-1670), the famous Czech educationist and Christian internationalist, equally known by his Moravian name, Jan Amos Komensky, demands both a survey of his life's work and an assessment of his significance. Neither is easy, for Comenius was a man of many parts, defying easy classification. Very much a child of his time in some respects, yet in others Comenius looked many generations beyond his own day. Educational reformer, mystic of the tradition of Jacob Boehme and Valentin Weigel, tireless European traveller, devotee of both Baconian science and millenary religion, prolific writer and unstinting advocate of many religious and educational causes ranging from missionary endeavour among the Red Indians of North America to the more efficient teaching of Latin, and with it all a devoted pastor of his persecuted flock of Moravian Christians (he was the last bishop of the Moravian Church), Comenius was among the most extraordinary men of the seventeenth-century European world. He is rightly and understandably honoured by the Czech people as one of their most spiritually noble sons.

Comenius was born on 28 March 1592, in eastern Moravia, probably at Nivnitz, into a pious family belonging to the Moravian Church, "Unity of Brethren." After studying at Herborn and Heidelberg, he became rector of a school in Prerov, subsequently taking orders in his Church to become pastor and rector at Fulnek. Yet the political turbulence of his time denied him any tranquillity. The outbreak of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) overwhelmed his native people with military catastrophe and religious persecution: after the battle of Prague (1620), the town of Fulnek was sacked by the Spanish army. Comenius lost everything—his wife and children, his possessions and writings—thenceforth being destined to spend much of his life wandering in exile, a victim of war and persecution. Amid such personal loss, and against such a backcloth of conflict, the spirit of Comenius was yet to flower in an educational and religious philosophy whose foci were peace and harmony, and whose driving motive was the quest for that brotherhood among men prophetic of the perfect heavenly fellowship.

Fleeing to Poland, he settled for a while at Leszno, where in 1630 he published *Pansophiae Prodromus*,[1] a far-reaching educational treatise

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1 For the full list of Comenius' works, see bibliography in M. W. KEATINGE (trs.): *The Great Didactic of John Amos Comenius* (London, 1896)

attempting to arrange all human knowledge as within the reach of the minds of all men. Many works poured from his prolific pen. 1636 saw his election as bishop of the Moravian community at Leszno, but by then his fame had spread far beyond Poland, for he had become part of that influential international community of Protestant men of letters and theologians, whose ideas crossed frontiers and came to the attention of leaders of Church and state throughout the anti-Catholic world. He particularly became associated with Samuel Hartlib of Prussia and John Dury, a Scot, whose interests encompassed all the major Protestant causes of the day; all three realized they shared a keen desire to promote schemes of social and educational improvement as part of a wider mission for a new Christian order. In England, where the religious and political struggle was moving towards the crisis of civil war, Hartlib published several of Comenius' pansophical works, aroused Puritan interest in his notions, and attracted the patronage of Bishop Williams of Lincoln, leader of the House of Lords and a devotee of the Pansophic Society. At Hartlib's persuasion, Comenius journeyed to England to promote his ideas of universal elementary education and the foundation of a Pansophical College (1641-2). Pym, the great Parliamentary leader, was much impressed: reform of all kinds was in the air. Yet it was not to be. The clash between King and Parliament forsook the road of peaceful change for that of civil strife: Comenius sailed for Sweden in June 1642. His visit to England was not entirely in vain: his presence had initiated discussions which led to the founding of the Royal Society in 1662, as well as to the establishment of primary schools under Oliver Cromwell. He had found time, too, to write *Via Lucis* ("The Way of Light"), an amalgam of Christian mysticism and plans of educational development, in which Comenius foresaw the ultimate dawning of the millenium as a result of the spread of knowledge, which he conceived as a dynamic religious force for the salvation of mankind. The universal spread of knowledge would lead to such harmony among men that the reign of Christ would surely occur.

The Swedish state, intent on promoting a national education system, invited Comenius to reform the country's schools. King Gustavus Adolphus, leader and saviour of European Protestantism, and Louis de Geer, financier, industrialist, and patron of scholars, took a keen interest in Comenius, welcomed his pedagogic schemes and were delighted by his new-style graded Latin textbooks. However, religious bigotry again brought him low. His activity at several ecumenical conferences caused annoyance in Swedish Lutheranism. Obliged to return to his Polish church duties, he spent time at Leszno, and at Elbing in West Prussia; in 1648 he was consecrated presiding bishop of the Moravians, being the last to hold that office. Invited to Hungary by Prince Sigismund to assist its educational advance, he set up there a Pansophic School, but disputes over doctrinal questions caused him much frustration yet again. Yet he had given the enlightened prince four years' zeal for school reform. As the tides of religious war spread again over central Europe, the luckless Comenius again lost all his possessions,

finally fleeing to the calm and tolerant atmosphere of Amsterdam, where he spent his closing years.

His contacts and correspondence were far wider than such a bald summary can adequately indicate: for instance, New England clergy showed keen interest in Comenius' views on church discipline. John Winthrop (Junior), visited Comenius in 1642 while seeking an outstanding educator-theologian to become Harvard College's President, and may have offered him this office. Many of Comenius' works were widely published during his lifetime in Latin, English, and German, as well as his native Czech.

For Comenius the aim of education was the promotion, under God, of universal brotherhood; the method of achieving it, "Pansophia," universal and systematized learning. In him concern for education thoroughly imbued with religious awareness was united with zeal for efficient organization along rational, scientific lines. In an age when education was disordered, cruel, and for the few, he urged that it be systematic, enlightened, and for the many. He argued for "the necessity, possibility, and practicability of universal wisdom," and against the damaging, narrowing effects of specialization (a theme very relevant today). He understood that specialization can only meaningfully be pursued upon the foundations of an awareness of universal culture. Such was very definitely Christian-oriented: "As all knowledge was to lead to God, and to God as revealed through Christ, Comenius spoke of his encyclopaedism as a Christian Pansophy." Education could lead youth to God through things—"to God as the source of all, and as the crown of knowledge and the end of life."

Comenius was the first exhaustive writer on the general method of education, and the pioneer of encyclopaedism. *Magna Didactica* ("The Great Didactic") was probably his most important educational work. It was sub-titled, characteristically:

> The whole art of teaching all things to all men, or, a certain inducement to found such schools in all the parishes, towns, and villages of every Christian Kingdom, that the entire Youth of both sexes shall quickly, pleasantly, and thoroughly become learned in the Sciences, pure in Morals, trained in Piety, and in this manner instructed in all things necessary for the present and for the future life.[2]

While Comenius believed he was enunciating educational aims and methods of lasting worth, he equally believed God would renew the war-stricken peoples of Europe through holy education:

> Perchance even now, after such a bloody war and after such devastation, the Father of mercy looks upon us graciously: how thankfully should we approach Him . . . working by those ways and means which the most wise God, the Ordainer of all things, will show us. The . . . Holy Scriptures teach us in this connection that there is no more certain way under the sun for the raising of sunken humanity than the proper education of the young.[3]

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[2] *op cit.*, p. 155
[3] *Ibid*, p. 166

Comenius never made a false distinction between the eternally valid and the immediately relevant. Nonetheless, education could not be seen in purely earthly terms, for the whole of life itself was but an education for eternity: "the visible world is a seed-plot, a boarding-house and training school for man." In accord with his preparation for eternity, God had vested in man the potential for all knowledge and power:

> Man should know all things . . . have power over all things and over himself . . . should refer himself and all things to God, the Source of All . . . God has placed the roots of eternal wisdom in man. He is fit to acquire all knowledge because he is the image of God . . . Man is a microcosm, in which are enfolded the seeds of all things, as well as of all knowledge.[4]

Upon such a lofty conception of Man's eternal purpose, Comenius built the practical details of his educational schemes.

Comenius was sure learning could be usually interesting, easy and relatively rapid; in his day, and too often today, the reverse is the case. The key to successful educational method was to be found in harmony with nature, by the development of intelligence, by explanation and understanding instead of memory work, by study from real life rather than books of theory. "Let the studies of the whole life be so arranged that they shall be one encyclopaedia, in which there shall be nothing which does not arise out of a common root."

An Infant School in every house, a Vernacular (Junior) School in every village and community, a Gymnasium (Secondary School) in every province, and a Pansophic University in every kingdom or region, was the broad system Comenius advocated in his day, much ahead of his own time, of course. In the Gymnasium, he envisaged an encyclopaedic course, for 12-to-18-year–old pupils, including four languages, Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy (the seven Liberal Arts then required to make a man a master in philosophy) ; also Physics, Natural History, Mineralogy, Geography, History, Ethics, and Theology. In the Pansophic University itself, the emphasis would be on Universal Knowledge, the student immersing himself in the study of all things. To many practical details, Comenius also gave meticulous care, having been himself a teacher and school organizer: from the size of classes and rapid language teaching to pupils being so organized as to teach each other. Yet the basic aim was never far away—to bring the young person into vital communion with God. The implanting of prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, morality, and self-discipline were accordingly vital elements in the educational process. The Bible was to be "the Alpha and Omega of Christian schools," and children were to be taught "to refer all things, whatsoever they hear or see, do or suffer, to God, mediately or immediately."

The whole environment of education should be such as to lead to that.

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[4] *The Great Didactic*, quoted in S. S. LAURIE: *John Amos Comenius: His Life and Educational Works* (New York. 1893) . pp. 78-79

> This ardour to acquire is to be excited by parents, who should evince their respect for schoolmasters and learning; by teachers, who should be kind, paternal, and ready to commend; by schools, which should be pleasant rooms, well lighted, clean, and adorned with pictures, etc.; by the things which the pupils study, which should be so presented as to attract; by the method, which should be the natural method.[5]

Such a comprehensive approach to education, religious in philosophy yet open to the highest promptings of the new scientific spirit of the seventeenth century, combining care for the individual with organizational perspective, both revolutionized the educational thinking of his day and began a process of change in educational practice whose manifestations continue in our own time. Certainly in his grasp of the significance of the Infant School, his enrichment of the Junior School, his concern for girls' education and his "scientific" approach to language teaching, he was in advance of his own time and relevant to ours. His *Gate of Languages Unlocked* (1631) revolutionized Latin teaching and was translated into sixteen languages, including Persian and Arabic. His *The Visible World in Pictures* (1658), a remarkable essay in Latin education through pictures, was popular for two centuries. His powerful advocacy of the broadest possible cultural and ethical education of the specialist is particularly appropriate in our day. He was a keen supporter of co-education. Finally, in all his educational concepts, he never lost the link between theory and practice: "He asked of the school and the pupil nothing that was impossible."[6]

Yet we remember him not only as an educator. For him, the pursuit of Pansophy was part of a wider religious purpose, the ushering in of the Kingdom of God. His *Labyrinth of the World* (1631) stands as a religious classic, telling of the pilgrimage of questing man through the follies and vanities of this world to the Castle of Fortune; the accompanying work, *The Paradise of the Heart,* dwells on Christ as "the centre of all things" and dispels the former work's pessimism with its pure Light mysticism. These works were a major source of consolation to the exiled Moravian Christians, whose sufferings prompted Comenius to appeal to all the Protestant churches for an ecumenical spirit, in his *The Bequest of the Unity of Brethren* (1650):

> I wish that all ye who count yourselves members of the one house of the church may also form a single house of God which would be well ordered and united, and in it one single household living under one single law of God, helping each member in concord and love.[7]

At a time when Protestants were united in little but common dislike of Catholics, Comenius was a real ecumenist, working and praying for the unity of God's people in very adverse circumstances.

His role of Christian peacemaker was also manifest politically. He attended the Colloquy at Thorn, Poland, called by King Wladislaw IV to

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5 *Op. cit.*, p. 90
6 N. M. BUTLER: *The Place of Comenius in the History of Education* (New York, 1892), p. 17
7 *The Bequest of the Unity of Brethren,* trs. M. SPINKA (Chicago, 1940), p. 29

work out a *modus vivendi* between Protestants and Catholics, and he addressed *The Angel of Peace* (1667) to the English and Dutch peace ambassadors at Breda, setting out timeless principles of international understanding, and taking as his theme "Christendom Reconcilable through Christ the Conciliator."

Amid so many adversities, disappointments, and persecutions, Comenius never developed a bitter spirit, always maintained his lofty ideals, and kept his hope in God and man. In this he was one of the finest examples of the Czech spiritual genius, in a tradition running from John Hus to Alexander Dubcek. Let us honour him, and his descendants in their present adversity, by recalling Comenius' inspiring and prophetic words spoken when he finally took leave of his native land:

> Nor can I forget thee, thou Czech and Moravian nation, now that I take my final leave! I trust God that after the passing of the storm of wrath which our sins have brought upon our heads, the rule of thine affairs shall again be restored to thee, O Czech people.[8]

BRIAN G. COOPER

As those who withstand thy progress along the path of right reason will never be able to turn thee aside from sound action, so let them not wrest thee from a kindly attitude towards them; but keep a watch over thyself in both directions alike, not only in steadfastness of judgment and action but also in gentleness towards those who endeavour to stand in thy path or be in some other way a thorn in thy side. For in fact it is a sign of weakness to be angry with them, no less than to shrink from action and be terrified into surrender. For they that do the one or the other are alike deserters of their post, the one as a coward, the other as estranged from a natural kinsman and friend.

—MARCUS AURELIUS

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8 *Op. cit.*, p. 31

For Comenius, see also: *Labyrinth of the World*, ed. and trs. *Count Lutzow* (London, 1901); M. SPINKA: *John Amos Comenius, That Incomparable Moravian* (Chicago, 1943); R. F. YOUNG: *Comenius in England* (London, 1932); J. PIAGET (ed.): *John Amos Comenius, Selections* (1957); H.R. TREVOR-ROPER: "Three Foreigners and the English Revolution," in *Encounter*, February 1960, pp. 3-20.

Traveller's Tales

(after reading R. C. Zaehner's *Mysticism: Sacred and Profane*)

A quartet of travellers—
Monist, Theist, Psychiatrist and Child—
Came to an open door.
"Enter alone"
(So ran the lintel's invitation),
"When you emerge declare
To others what is to be found within."

The men drew lots—the Monist's turn came first.
"A crystal ball," he smiled on his return,
"As used by seaside fortune-tellers.
At first it seems that shapes lurk deep within,
But these oneself projects, like lantern-slides
Which once removed the lighted screen is blank."

The Theist entered next. "A hollow globe,"
He said, "like a glass float on a fishing-net—
But filled completely with—what shall I say?
—If liquid: water? gin? pure alcohol?
Words fail me!"

The Psychiatrist stayed longer than the others
And came out looking thoughtful.
"I think we cannot justify the postulate
That the sphere is otherwise than empty—
Like an electric globe without a filament—
Its shape, and lights striking from without,
Account for what we think we see within.
I speak, I may say, subject to correction."

The Child, seeing the door open, slipped in first
And hid behind a curtain.
Only now, when his turn came, they missed him—
A mystery soon solved, for out he ran
His face alight with joy, his lips apart—
But no words came:
Only within the open mouth appeared
A bubble.

ROY OLIVER

New Books and Old

An Introduction to Advaita Vedanta*

WE HAVE here a book which is at once more ambitious and more penetrating than the usual run of publications on the subject of Advaita Vedanta. From the days of Deussen and Max Müller, the subject has attracted attention in the West; and in India numerous detailed studies of the system have appeared from the historico-critical and comparative standpoints besides dependable expositions from the traditional angle. It is only in the recent decade that we see new exponents like Karl Potter and Ninian Smart who have brought to bear on Indian thought a new approach by treating it as something valuable in itelf on its own terms. This book is characterized in the subtitle as a "Philosophical Reconstruction" and it is so ably accomplished that the author deserves unstinted praise. Professor Deutsch has focused attention only on the basic ideas which have abiding philosophical value. He keeps clear of historical surveys as well as superficial comparisons. He is not tempted to parade a plethora of textual references in Sanskrit or in English translation. He has tried to present the very kernel of Advaita Vedanta as implied in the Upanishadic *mahavakyas* and explained by Shankara and other writers of his school.

The emphasis throughout is on laying bare the implications of the vision of Reality by the Upanishadic sages in the light of later Vedanta passages, which purport to give a systematic account of Reality in relation to *Jiva* and *Jagat*. He has correctly emphasized that the central affirmation of Advaita is: "The Self is One, it is not different from *Brahman*" (p. 65), an essentially spiritual affirmation which is both meta-religious and meta-psychological.

The book is divided into eight chapters, the first four expounding the nature of *Brahman*, levels of being, *Brahman* and the world, and the Self. The concept of *Karma* is subjected to a critical examination in the fifth, and the author concludes that it is only a "convenient fiction" admitted by Advaita, though it does not directly follow from its philosophical tenets. Aspects of Advaitic epistemology are treated in the sixth chapter, while Advaitic ethics come in for consideration in the seventh. Finally, the efficacy of *Jnanayoga* is brought out as a pathway to *Moksha* in the eighth chapter.

The author shows throughout a firm grasp of the basic principles and endeavours to avoid numerous details with which the system bristles. His treatment is well designed to bring to the fore broad issues which have metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical implications. His style is both clear and concise, making the book one of the finest introductions to the profound system of Vedanta.

But once in a way it appears as though the author had not taken pains to verify the Sanskrit texts in the original. When he coins the fresh term "subration" (p. 15) for the Sanskrit *badha*, one may allow him the privilege; but when he characterizes the world which is *vyavaharika* as

> the level of *Maya* that denotes the totality or errors caused by *avidya*. It is *sadasadvilak-*

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* *Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction*. By ELIOT DEUTSCH. (East-West Centre Press, Honolulu. 119 pp. 1969. $6.00)

shana, other than the real or the unreal, or *anirvacaniya,* indescribable in terms of being and non-being (p. 32),

he is carrying his interpretation of *Maya* or *Avidya* one step beyond the permissible limit. It should not be forgotten that *Saguna Brahman,* his *Maya,* and the result of the two, namely, *Jiva* and *Jagat,* are solid concessions of Advaita to popular theistic religion endowing them with a kind of working truth or reality. The author has confused the cause with the effect in his eagerness to emphasize that Advaita does not condemn the world to unreality. However, the author has correctly affirmed this in a section on "Advaita's Realistic Epistemology" (pp. 94-97) in explaining phenomenal experience.

The same confusion is at the back of his statement "*Ishvara* is a 'content of experience' as *Saguna Brahman,* the harmonization of distinctions" (p. 43). *Ishvara,* as Indian Vedantic tradition understands, is God conceived in a personal form for the purposes of religious worship and is by no means any human experience. Again we find the mistake repeated on p. 39 where Divine *Lila* is described: "*Lila* thus removes all motive, purpose and responsibility from Ishvara in his creative activity." Actually, *Lila* is positive pleasure and a value in itself, though without any other ulterior value. The triple cosmic functions of creation, sustenance, and destruction are the ground for positing an *Ishvara,* and to remove him from the charge of partiality, the doctrine of *Karma* is brought in. From this point of view the author's contention that "*Karma* is a convenient fiction" (p. 69) loses force. He thinks that *arthapatti* and *Shabdapramanas* cannot prove *Karma;* but Indian tradition has no doubt that *Karma* is proved by these *pramanas.* What is meta-religious cannot disprove a religious reality. Not Advaita Vedanta alone, but even heretical schools like Buddhism and Jainism in India take *Karma* as a self-evident postulate to explain the nature of *Samsara.* Even the purely logical *Vaisheshika* system has found it necessary to accept *Karma* as a factor involved in creation.

Notwithstanding some of these minor issues, the book provides a very handy, readable, and thoughtful study of the subject. We have no doubt that it will serve as the best introduction available to the cream of Vedanta not only for academicians but also for general readers. The chief merit of the book is its lucidity of expression and clarity of exposition. We wish this neatly produced book would find a place in all our libraries.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

The Tantric Mysticism of Tibet*

Perhaps no branch of Indian religious literature and practice has come in for so much criticism and condemnation as the Buddhist and the Hindu Tantra. But in recent times, however, there has been a gradual shift in the orientation. So far as the Hindu Tantras are concerned, the writings of Sir John Woodroffe, and his publication of the Tantric texts were largely responsible for initiating the change. For the Buddhist Tantras the writings of Evans-Wentz, Guiseppe Tucci, Herbert Guenther, and Lama Govinda, to mention only a few names, have done a similar service. The author of the

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* *The Way of Power: A Practical Guide to the Tantric Mysticism of Tibet.* By JOHN BLOFELD. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 255 pp. 1970. 45s., i.e. £2.25)

present book has drawn on the works of these scholars for information and explanation.

The book bears the subtitle *A Practical Guide to the Tantric Mysticism of Tibet,* and deals mainly with the Vajrayana or Adamantine Vehicle, a school of Mahayana Buddhism prevalent in Tibet and Mongolia. When Buddhism reached Tibet from India and China in the middle of the eighteenth century of our era, the Tibetans were a primitive people for ever engaged in feuds among petty rulers. From India and China they took relatively little besides Buddhism. Even their adaptation of an Indian script to suit their own tongue was dictated not by the wish for a written language *per se* but by the desire to have a means of perpetuating Buddhism in their country.

After the Chinese occupation of Tibet in our own times, there has been a large-scale exodus of Buddhist scholars from Tibet. It is interesting to read here that among the Tibetan refugees who have poured into India, Sikkim, and Nepal are enlightened Lamas from the great monastic seats of learning and accomplished *yogis* driven from their mountain fastnesses. Of these, a handful have made their way to Europe and America to work in universities or to found *gompas* in lonely places that will become centres of meditation. In England and the United States especially, there are flourishing meditation centres which have to turn away students for lack of accommodation.

At Samye Ling on the Scottish moors there is a small Buddhist *gompa* which has attracted a band of Lamas and more students than it can provide for. The author had his training at this centre and has dedicated this book to the Lamas and their pupils there and to his fellow student John Driver.

The book falls into two equal Parts, the first dealing with the background and rationale, and the other with practice. The subject is treated in considerable detail from the standpoint of a practising aspirant. Tantric Buddhism particularly emphasizes method as opposed to mere piety or scholarship. It is the distinction of the system that in it wisdom (*Prajna*) and expedient means (*Upaya*) form an inseparable couple.

The theme has been dealt with competently although there is considerable overlapping and repetition of ideas and facts; but it is obvious that the author speaks in all sincerity from personal experience. It is neither possible nor necessary in the course of a brief review to give a summary of the material collected in the book. So only a few points of general interest will be referred to. The question of the relationship between the Hindu and Buddhist Tantras is of interest although it is not possible to determine which of them has priority. They supplement each other, and the relationship between them is comparable to that of a photographic negative and a print.

Next there is the familiar criticism that Tantric Buddhism represents a debased and degraded variety of early "pure" Buddhism. The author rebuts this position and cites with approval the observation of Dr. Snellgrove that

> however great may be the divergence between the Buddhism of the early schools and the stage we have now reached, nothing new has been adopted without first ensuring that it should accord with the doctrinal position. The doctrine itself still remained consciously Buddhist and what is more remarkable still continued to do so, even when feminine partners were introduced into the system.

About the Lamas in general the author notes an agreeable trait:

> Happily, there is no humourless intensity about them. Advanced adepts are invariably relaxed and gently gay, fond of laughter, affectionate and uncensorious. Where there is tight-lipped solemnity, something has surely gone wrong with the practice. Of the dozen or so notable Lamas I have met, all struck me as charmingly light-hearted.

As an illustration of the openness of their attitude the author gives an instance concerning a Lama who afterwards became the Abbot of Samye Ling:

> Told of a Druidic Circle of stones in the neighbourhood of his future *gompa* (monastery), he said thoughtfully: "One of these nights, I must go to that circle to meditate. If the local deity appears and seems well disposed, I shall perhaps invite him to become one of the Guardians of our *gompa*."

The author stresses the importance of the *Yidam* (Sanskrit: *Ishtadevata*) —the indwelling deity—in the course of Tantric *sadhana*. Although essentially emanating from the *sadhaka's* own mind, *Yidams* seem to belong to an order of phenomena possessing definite effectiveness, and have a type of reality comparable to that of the Jungian "archetypes" which are described as the common property of the entire human race.

In brief, the book is a fair presentation of the Tibetan Tantric way of power (*sadhana*), and also personal testimony that, even today, *sadhana* **can lead to** *siddhi* (power).

K. GURU DUTT

The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation or The Method of Realizing Nirvana through knowing the Mind. Edited and annotated with Introductions by W. Y. EVANS-WENTZ. With a Psychological Commentary by C. G. JUNG. (Oxford University Press, New York. 268 pp. Paperback, 1968. $2.25)

This fourth volume of Dr. Evans-Wentz's noted Tibetan series was first published by the Oxford University Press in 1954. Inasmuch as this volume expounds the quintessence of the Supreme Path, the Mahayana, it not only supplements the three previous volumes but is in some respects the most important member of the Series. Dr. C. G. Jung, "the distinguished Dean of Western psychologists," as Dr. Evans-Wentz aptly calls him, has as usual contributed a valuable Psychological Commentary in which he discusses the differences between Eastern and Western modes of thought and equates "The Collective Unconscious" with the Buddhist *Dharma-Kaya*. In the East, mind is a cosmic factor, the very essence of existence; while in the West it is just being realized that it is the essential condition of cognition and hence of the cognitive existence of the world. The psyche and its structure enable us to transform material objects into psychic images, wavelengths into notes of sound, colours, fragrances, and tastes. The East therefore bases itself on psychic reality, while the West on an independent objective world. Introversion is, if one may so express it, the style of the East; while extraversion is the habitual attitude of the West.

The next part of the book is a General Introduction by Dr. Evans-Wentz in which he explains in great detail the Nature of this One Mind, the Cosmic All-consciousness, and its relation to the individualized minds. There is also a valuable section on "Wisdom versus Knowledge" and a brief account of the life and teachings of the great Guru Padma-Sambhava. This is followed by a translation of *The Yoga of Knowing the Mind;* and the book concludes with an account of the precepts of the Guru, who delivered his teachings in songs and hymns.

The essence of the teaching of the Guru may be summarized in one sentence as follows:

> Mind and matter are, in their final analysis indistinguishable, matter being merely what may be called a crystalline aspect of mind concretely manifested.

In Western scientific terms this would mean that matter is a form of energy,

since mass and energy are proved to be convertible terms. As the great astronomer Sir James Jeans put it:

> Today there is a wide measure of agreement which on the physical side of science approaches almost unanimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality, the Universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine. The old dualism between mind and matter disappears.

If this point of view is right then it may be truly said that the One Mind is the unique root of all energy and the sole dynamo of universal power. The One Mind, as reality, is the heart which pulsates for ever sending forth the blood-streams of existence and taking them back again. The unenlightened man imagines that he is possessed of an individualized mind uniquely his own, but the Tibetan teachers declare that the One Cosmic Mind alone is unique and that it manifests itself as the Many only illusorily by means of a reflected, or subsidiary, mind appropriate to and common to all living things. There is only a single speaker, but his voice is broadcast to all the millions of the earth's inhabitants; there is only a single power-house but a million electric lights are illuminated by it. There is a single sun but it gives life and light to innumerable living things. Behind all the diversity that one sees in the world, there is One Cosmic Mind in which the wise ones seek "the undifferentiated Thatness, the Unborn, the Unshaped, the quality-less, the non-cognizable and the Unpredicable."

This is the essence of the wisdom of The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation. Dr. Evans-Wentz has laid the English-speaking public under a deep debt of gratitude by making available the precious teaching.

B. V. NARAYANA REDDY

Avatar and Incarnation: The Wilde Lectures in Natural and Comparative Religion in the University of Oxford. By GEOFFREY PARRINDER. (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 296 pp. 1970. 60*s.*, i.e. £3.00)

It is the central teaching of orthodox Christianity that Jesus was God incarnate and that as such he is distinguished from all other human beings. To many people today it seems incredible that God should be incarnate in one single figure in human history. Today therefore there is a new interest in the Hindu conception of *Avatara* (the "descent" of God into our life), which is held to apply, not to any one individual exclusively, but to a succession of individuals down the ages. Dr. Geoffrey Parrinder, who is reader in Comparative Religion in the University of London, institutes a careful and closely documented survey of the conception of *Avatara* as it has been taught traditionally in Hinduism, and as it has been conceived in modern times by such teachers as Ramakrishna, Aurobindo, and Radhakrishnan. He proceeds to discuss the related concept of the Buddha and to consider the alleged occurrence of a doctrine of Incarnation among the Sufis. In the third and final section of his book he seeks to relate these Eastern doctrines to the Christian belief.

In his earlier book, *Light from the East,* Dr. Parrinder suggested that, with the doctrine of Incarnation as with other Christian doctrines, the study of Eastern religion might help in the development of a new and wider outlook. In his new book his attitude to Eastern teaching is less favourable. Thus in sketching the background of *Avatara* he says that Hindu monism (or "non-dualism") "denies the important doctrine of evil," and leads to "a complete otherworldliness." In his earlier book he says that "some *Avatars* have strong claims to historicity. At least their

human lives are believed to be real and not illusory." Now he says that the *Avatars* have little, if any historical significance, and that in fact they are "divine and not human." They "were never really men," but they have their value as preparations for Christ.

Dr. Parrinder has a good deal to say about the development of Buddhist teaching, and he quotes from *The Lotus of the Wonderful Law*. Yet he does not appear to recognize the striking similarity of its teaching regarding the person of the Buddha to that of the *Bhagavad-Gita* regarding Krishna. Just as in the *Gita* Krishna is a manifestation of *Brahman,* so in the *Lotus* the Buddha is identified with the supreme and eternal Reality, the *Dharmakaya* (the eternal Buddha). Shakyamuni is in fact the eternal Buddha in his historical manifestation. And, just as, according to the *Gita, Avatars* appear when there is "an uprising of unrighteousness," so the *Dharmakaya* is manifested "when men become unbelieving, ignorant, careless, fond of sensual pleasures."

SIDNEY SPENCER

The Unexpected Universe. By LOREN EISELEY. (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London. 239 pp. 1970. 36*s.*, i.e. £1.80).

Here is a view of the universe and man's evolution in it as seen by one who is both scientist and poet. Writing with great beauty of style and language, Dr. Eiseley conveys a vast amount of fascinating, sometimes terrifying, fact; his own reflections thereon are profound.

The word "unexpected" in the title strikes the keynote, for he contrasts the "supposedly stable" pre-Darwinian order with the limitless unknown to which we must adjust our thinking now. "Never before in human history has the mind soared higher and seen less to cheer its complacency." There are startling proofs that "instability lies at the heart of the world."

What comfort for us? None, perhaps. Only a challenge. For even if man owes his being "to the unexpected nature of the universe," so, "more than any other living creature he contains, unknowingly, the shapes and forms of an uncreated future to be drawn from our own substance." At the same time, Dr Eisely provides small lovely instances of quite a different scale of values—the orb spider, the compassionate Pharaoh, the playful fox-cub—while the chapter entitled "The Star Thrower" is pure poetry.

One does not necessarily seek theosophic undertones in every writer, but it is interesting to note the Doctor's view that the human blood cells have "some kind of elementary intelligence" (as of "creatures without whose ministrations I could not exist") and his mention of "Man, increasingly a homeless orphan lost in the vast abysses of space and time," echoes a famous theosophic phrase.

Dr. Eisely is Professor of Anthropology and the History of Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and Curator of Early Man at the University Museum. With true scholarly exactitude he provides a copious biography.

Well and good, but let us procure his own books first! We cannot have too much of such *interpretative* science.

JOAN N. BURNETT

The Gitabhashya of Ramanuja. Trs. by M. R. SAMPATKUMARAN. (Professor M. Rangacharya Memorial Trust, Madras. 586 pp. 1969. Rs. 15).

The English translation of the *Gitabhashya* by Shri M. R. Sampatkumaran is a publication of Professor M. Rangacharya Memorial Trust, aided by the Ministry of Education and Government of India. Herein the author endeavours to enlighten the readers regarding the views of Ramanuja, both with the scientific and systematic approach of a research scholar and with the missionary zeal of a religious teacher.

The introduction of thirty-one pages is divided into eight parts. In the first part, he apprises the reader of the books written by Shri-Ramanuja. In the second part, he informs the reader how Shri-Ramanuja was inspired by the contemporary trends of thought and *Gitarthasangraha* by Shri-Yamuna. In the third and the fourth, the author explains the concepts of the Vishishtadvaita on the *Gita* with special reference to Shri-Ramanuja. In the fifth part, he deals with *Prapatti,* or complete reliance on God's grace, and the *Bhakti Yoga* taught in the *Gita.* In the sixth part he describes the personality of Shri-Ramanuja, as revealed in the commentary on the *Gita,* in the following words: "His own character stands revealed as a mystic, a devotee of God and a preceptor eager and competent to transform disciples by his teaching." In the seventh and eighth parts he evaluates the contribution of Shri-Ramanuja and Shri-Vedanta-Desika in this field.

The book is divided into eighteen *adhyayas,* corresponding with those of the original *Gita.* While translating the verses of the *Gita* and the commentary, the author scrupulously explains all the controversial views and words most lucidly.

Therefore it may be said that this book is of immense value in the field of metaphysical thought. It helps students of Indian philosophy and Sanskrit literature towards a correct understanding of Vishishtadvaita.

S. N. GAYATONDE

Dickens 1970. Centenary Essays by WALTER ALLEN, MARGARET LANE, PAMELA HANSFORD JOHNSON, C. P. SNOW, BARBARA HARDY, RAYMOND WILLIAMS, JOHN HOLLOWAY, ANGUS WILSON. Edited by MICHAEL SLATER. (Chapman and Hall Ltd., London, in association with The Dickens Fellowship. xiii+ 241pp. 1970. Illustrated. 45s., i.e. £2.25)

The centenary of the death of the most popular English novelist of all time has already produced some notable re-assessments and critical appraisals of his genius. And so it is fitting that the great writer's original publishers should publish this well-printed volume of centenary essays by eight well-known critics and authors of contemporary fiction, under the editorship of *The Dickensian.*

All of this encourages the opinion, widely held by the average reader, that Dickens is beyond criticism. Of all the English novelists he alone retains undiminished the world audience that he created in his own lifetime. Hence this volume is quite rightly a collection of appreciations of some particular aspect of his genius by a contemporary practitioner of the art of fiction, or studies of some interesting minor topic relating to his method.

To those who are familiar with the masterpieces, the first three essays will undoubtedly enrich their appreciation of Dickens as the literary artist; for they comprise Professor Walter Allen on "The Comedy of Dickens" (a gigantic subject in itself) and here Dickens is aptly placed with Chaucer and Shakespeare; followed by a critical examination by Barbara Hardy of

"The Complexity of Dickens," in which we are given a fluent analysis of his ability to "plumb the depths" as well as to skim the surface of human behaviour; and the last in this opening group is an illuminating interpretation of Dickens's use of symbolism, in the sense that in *Little Dorrit* "the informing symbol, or emblem" is the prison.

Part Two is devoted to three essays on Dickens as the critic of society, his social ideas, and the public service. And the last section consists of three profoundly interesting essays on sexual life in the novels (by Pamela Hansford Johnson); "Dickens on the Hearth" (Margaret Lane); and Dickens on children and childhood (Angus Wilson). In all, a rewarding volume for the modern reader, with nine of the familiar illustrations and an attractive endpaper.

F. SEYMOUR SMITH

Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order. By REINHARD BENDIX. (Wiley Eastern Private Ltd., New Delhi. 314 pp. 1969. Rs. 13.20)

"To future historians it may appear as a touching if minor irony that an organic conception of society based on the idea of equilibrium is one of the major intellectual perspectives of our time," says Dr. Reinhard Bendix, concluding this revised edition of his book published in 1964. In it Dr. Bendix makes an important contribution to the analysis and assessment of social and political changes in the last two centuries or so resulting in the transformation of West European and some Asian societies into modern industrialized societies through a process of socialization. After devoting a chapter to the development of Western European countries from "aristocratic" nations into "democratic" ones, he says that "the constitution of a modern nation-state is typically the fountain-head of the rights of citizenship" and these rights are "a token of nationwide equality."

With progressive extension of democratization there has been in these countries a broadening of the basis of participation by the lower classes in government and administration. To this process the evolution of ideas of equality of all men before the the law, equality of opportunity for education, and the extension of the franchise, on the one side and the emergence of totalitarian regimes with their accent on enforced economic and social equality on the other, have contributed though in different ways. On the other hand, extension of the principles of legal and political equality has also resulted in the change from the "patrimonial" order of a king exercising unlimited authority to "bureaucratization," in which authority is distributed along a hierarchy of officials. "Increasing access to public employment and to influence upon administrative implementation of policies are a counterpart to an extension of citizenship" which in turn brought about changes in the attitudes of social groups, from loyalty to groups to loyalty to the nation.

Dr. Bendix devotes a chapter to the development in the concepts of citizenship and nationalism and the changes that have occurred in those conceptions in the post-Second-War period in two countries, Germany and Japan, in which in the pre-war period a spirit of extreme and narrow nationalism predominated. Their defeat in the war and occupation by the Allied armies produced rapid changes in their outlook which enabled them to become modern industrialized societies in a short time. With the strong industrial base they had even before the war, the transformation was quicker than it could otherwise have been. In their case, especially in the case of Japan, military defeat provided an impetus to shed the

feudal legacies of the past and to launch themselves vigorously on the path of industrialization.

Dr. Bendix devotes a long chapter to India, taking for analysis the community-development programme as an effort at organizing mass support for the modernizing of India. India exemplified, Dr. Bendix says, some of the problems faced by countries that attempt to build viable communities in the middle of the twentieth century. The community development movement is the outcome of a drive towards rapid industrialization and aims to advance the social and economic level of the bulk of the Indian population in the rural areas. It is also inspired by the ambitious objective of "implementing egalitarian policies in a social structure marked by great inequalities."

The working of the programme in the last nearly two decades leads Dr. Bendix to some interesting conclusions. One of them is that it would induce local leaders to send away active individuals from the lower strata aspiring to replace these leaders to the cities and government employment, and another is that local leaders would try to derive maximum benefits from Government grants and local control over their distribution, without being very much interested in the modernizing aims of the Five-Year Plans.

While currently this is true in a large measure, in the long run this trend is bound to change and result in the break-up of the traditional authority of the village élite despite resistance from that quarter. Universal adult franchise and the progressive adoption of socialistic or egalitarian policies by the present ruling party, and their profession equally vehemently by other political parties, make this change more or less inevitable. Dr. Bendix would probably find if he visited India now that this trend has in fact become more pronounced than when he wrote in 1964.

C. V. H. RAO

The Dermis Probe. By IDRIES SHAH. (Jonathan Cape, London. 191 pp. 1970. 35*s*., i.e. £1.75)

Periodically mankind's need for intellectual growth produces a reaction against old forms of mental expression and rigid one-way thinking. Western thinkers now are being drawn more to "novel" disciplines, such as the lateral thinking of Edward de Bono, or the "irrationalities" of Zen and Sufism. This book's enigmatic title derives from an early tale used by Jalaludin Rumi, and drawn upon for Richard William's prize-winning film (1965), scripted by Idries Shah, with a modern setting. A mystery surface, greyish, striated, fissured, has been researched by the World Commission of Scientists, with all the sophisticated techniques at its command, and is being shown on television. When however (as the camera pans back), the scale of perception is altered, the object *in toto* turns out to be a large elephant. This sets the keynote for anecdotes with a similar twist, humorous tales slyly mocking personal follies, aphorisms and proverbs from Sufi sources—"One lie will keep out forty truths"—"If you want to know what he's like—reverse what his opponents say."

There are touches of shrewd psychology. A patient, crudely told by the medical student to take pomegranates, departs in dudgeon. Another goes away grateful and delighted with the doctor's verdict:

> You are a difficult and intricate case, I can see that. Let me see . . . yes, you need a special diet. This must be composed of something round, with small sacs inside, naturally occurring. An orange—that would be of the wrong colour. . . . lemons are too acid . . . I have it: pomegranates!

Why had not the Master simply

told the patient "pomegranates" straight away? " 'Because,' said the Sufi, 'he needed *time* as well as pomegranates.' "

The prescription for this book is that it should not be gulped, but sipped—to bring out the taste.

E. DRURY

Gandhi: The Man of the Ages. By T. L. VASWANI. (Mira Publications, Poona. Lalvani Publishing House, Bombay. 72 pp. 1969. Rs. 3.00)

Sadhu Vaswani, who passed away in 1966, when he was eighty-six, was a host in himself, a dedicated soul, a mystic, a poet, and a great humanist. He was among the earliest in India to greet Gandhiji as the deliverer of the nation. In this volume are brought together notes of talks he gave, mostly to the Gita Class in Poona in 1952. They deal in eloquent and poetic language with the spiritual significance of Gandhiji's life, so necessary now when "the world is drifting to a new period of darkness." The book has a fine portrait of Sadhu Vaswani as a frontispiece.

K. SAMPATHGIRI RAO

Nothing should more deeply shame the modern student, than the recency and inadequacy of his acquaintance with India. Here is a vast peninsula nearly two million square miles; two thirds as large as the United States and twenty times the size of its (erstwhile) master Great Britain, 320,000,000 souls—more than in all North and South America combined, or one-fifth of the population of the earth; an impressive continuity of development and civilization from Mohenjo-daro 2900 B.C. or earlier to Gandhi, Raman and Tagore; faiths encompassing every stage from barbarous idolatry to the most subtle and spiritual pantheism; philosophers playing a thousand variations on the monistic theme from Upanishads, eight centuries before Christ, to Shankara eight centuries after him; scientists developing astronomy three thousand years ago, and winning Nobel Prizes in our own time; a democratic constitution of untraceable antiquity in the villages, and wise and beneficent rulers like Ashoka and Akbar in the capitals; minstrels singing great Epics as old as Homer, and poets holding world audiences today; artists raising gigantic temples for Hindu gods from Tibet to Ceylon and from Cambodia to Java, or carving palaces by the score for Mogul Kings and Queens—this is the India that patient scholarship is now opening up like a new intellectual continent, to the western mind which only yesterday thought civilization an exclusively European thing.

—WILL DURANT: *The Story of Civilization*

Correspondence

A Letter from Geneva

The Future of Man and Technology

My increasing conviction that real progress in inter-cultural understanding and inter-faith dialogue can better be achieved by a common consideration of urgent issues facing contemporary mankind, rather than by a purely doctrinal and necessarily somewhat speculative intellectual discourse, was greatly deepend by recent participation in an unusual international conference of scientists, technologists, social thinkers, anthropologists, and theologians held at Geneva early in July 1970. Convened by the World Council of Churches' Church and Society department under the theme of "The Future of Man and Society in a World of Science-Based Technology," the participants represented most of the globe's major religious, cultural, and intellectual traditions, the major exception being Communist China. India, Japan, the African nations, the Arab world, and Latin America were all well represented, to a degree which more than balanced the sizeable North American and European contingents seemingly inevitable at such occasions. The balance was necessary and appropriate. If the North Atlantic voice became too zealous and un-self-critical over the benefits of modern technology (which occurred not very often, but occasionally), then a voice from the Third World readily expressed pressing awareness of technology's shortcomings for being "a carrier of alien ideas and values." If the Western mind dwelt too laboriously upon technology as a secularizing force menacing traditional religious customs and concepts, then the Eastern was quick to remind of its beneficial practical consequences in terms of health and welfare.

If such undoubtedly desirable consequences of science and technology gained assent across the international cultural spectrum, the dangers of a technology become demonic were equally widely, and more passionately, shared. Naturally, the delegates' differing socio-economic backgrounds influenced their sense of priorities, those from the "developed world" (some called it the "over-developed world") expressing most anxiety over problems of pollution, conservation, and environmental decay, while those from the less-developed countries were most keenly worried about technology used for military repression from within or without, and about the obsession with economic growth in today's world being at the expense of social justice. South American delegates told harrowingly of the widening gap between rich and poor in their own countries, and called for a "theology of liberation," a phrase to link the aspirations of Christians and Marxists alike in that troubled continent. A general consensus of horror greeted scientists' prognostications about the prospects for germ warfare. German research biologist Dr. Ernst von Weizsacker spoke of "the danger of an insidious escalation from the use of nerve gases to all-out attacks capable of destroying entire continents," and put the issue into a wider context:

> Third World countries, ill prepared from a health standpoint, are rightly apprehensive of the special dangers of biological and chemical weapons, which is why most of them are more than ready for their complete renunciation, even though they could use the biological weapons as a kind of counter-threat against the great powers. How near we are

in principle to the quiet use of violence by means of biological weapons is clear when we remember that every year millions of people die of hunger and famine diseases in the Third World, that the working capacity of the living is severely curtailed by hunger and disease, and that the industrial countries are almost wholly responsible for this situation. The aid we fail to give is in many quarters seen as an offensive against the underdeveloped countries. (E. VON WEISACKER: "The Hopes of a Scientific Age")

Professor S. L. Parmar of India insisted that non-Western societies be on their guard against unwittingly importing Western materialistic values along with Western machines. Western high-consumption attitudes, advertising techniques full of half-truths and appeals to base, acquisitive instincts, and preoccupation with power as means of manipulating people and societies, were all insidious dangers to the Asian world today. The pursuit of social justice had to be established as the central goal; for economic growth was a secular mirage. Professor Raymond Panickar, a fellow Indan whose academic duties divide his time between Harward, U.S.A., and Banaras, thought nationalism when allied with modern technology was destructive in East and West alike, cogently pleading that the world-unifying potential of technology be used to build up a genuine international family. Technology both enhanced and endangered mankind's "human possibilities," and its control was a spiritual and ethical problem: "technology cannot be controlled by mere technology."

The terrible dangers for humanity of ceasing to live in harmony with nature, and of embracing a philosophy of "progress at all costs" and "domination over" the natural order, were made abundantly clear by Professor J. N. Black, Professor of Forestry and Natural Resources at Edinburgh University, who called for a return to the notions of human stewardship and responsibility for God's creation. He believed such concepts almost universal in different religions:

> ... in Eastern ideas of the law and order of the universe, or in the message of the *Quran*, that man is placed on earth to be God's *khalifa*, or steward. It is perhaps because so many people today have ceased to believe in anything at all that we are in such trouble; any system of beliefs that confers a framework of responsibility is preferable to none at all.

Such could be based on a "subtle blend of many different world-views." Man's ruination of his environment imperilled his own future: "we are dealing with a species, *Homo sapiens*, threatened with extinction; only by the wise use of resources and the conservation of our environment can extinction be avoided." Biological research constituted another vast new problem area, emphasized Professor Charles Birch, world authority on genetics from Sydney University, Australia. Genetical engineering, drastic methods to control and reduce population, and new methods of improving the genetical make-up of mankind posed new threats to human freedom and augured greater social restrictions. Scientists of the world were looking to "the men of faith" for moral answers and ethical guidance, yet were finding little. A similar call for religious light upon technological darkness was made by one of America's leading computer experts, Professor Austin Hoggatt of Berkeley, California, who urged "the keepers of values" to offer decisive moral guidance to "the keepers of the techniques." Implicit or explicit in all such discussion was the universal fear, however variedly expressed, that man's technological power was running out of his control and assuming demonic proportions, or mesmerizing people by its power and enslaving them with new idolatries.

A very distinctive contribution to the East-West debate was made by Professor Kinhide Mushakoji of Sophia University, Tokyo, who argu-

ed persuasively that the shortcomings of modern technological society resulted from a Wetern-derived "Man controlling Nature" philosophy. This was neither totally feasible, nor conducive to harmony in the essential Man-Nature-Machine relationship. The time was more than overdue for Western scientific man to take into his thinking Oriental concepts. Professor Mushakoji singled out both *Ahimsa*, the Gandhian reverence for life that would kill neither men nor nature, and Chinese *Yin-Yang*, the "two principles" concepts in this context making for "co-existence" between Man, Nature, and Machine, as very relevant to mankind's current situation. Technology could only become fully acceptable, indeed fully comprehensible, if such neglected Oriental insights were infused into its cultural framework.

Professor Mushakoji was strongly supported by Professor Pyongchoon Hahm, Director of the Social Science Research Institute at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea, who deplored the militarism and aggressiveness permeating so much Western thinking about Man's relationship to nature, and said Man must recognize his interdependence and "overlapping" with animate and inanimate nature.

A genuine international and cross-cultural meeting of minds occurred, for which reason, as much as for the gravity of the issues considered, the 1970 Geneva "Future of Man" conference was an altogether memorable occasion.

BRIAN G. COOPER

But to everyone, in whatever state of life he finds himself, the ethic of respect for life does this: it forces him ever and again to be inwardly concerned with all the human destinies and all the other life-destinies which are going through their life-course around him, and to give himself, as man, to the man who needs a fellow-man. It will not allow the learned man to live only for his learning, even if his learning makes him very useful, nor the artist to live only for his art, even if by means of it he gives something to many. It does not allow the very busy man to think that with his professional activities he has fulfilled every demand upon him. It demands from all and every that they devote a portion of their life to their fellows. In what way and to what extent this is laid down for him the individual must gather from the thoughts which arise in him, and from the destinies in which his life moves.

—ALBERT SCHWEITZER

Ends and Sayings

" . . . ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER : *Hudibras*

Northrop Frye, Professor of English at the University of Toronto, in his B.B.C. talk "Communications" (*The Listener*, 9 July 1970) challenges the claim that the printed word has been outmoded by the development of oral communications dependent on electronic media. In all countries, he says, communication through mass media is a one-way street

> . . . selling us food, cars, political leaders, culture, contemporary issues, and remedies against the migraine we get from listening to it . . . forming our habits of speech, our processes of thought.

There may well be "a general social resentment against being always treated as an object to be stimulated." Resentment plus the inability to escape or to resist an involuntary response to conditioning can breed panic, and this, he suggests, may be at the root of mob violence, or of escapism into drugs and music that also "drugs." Politically the public response to the enforced international "togetherness" (as a result of a greater range of broadcasting) is that of repudiation, separation. Most technological developments increase this introvert tendency (e.g., private cars), bringing about alienation from real community and its satisfactions. Paradoxically they have also increased the loss of privacy, thus providing the worst of both worlds. Current vandalisms, hysterical berserk outbursts, whether silly or vicious, are attempts at counter-communication, doomed, however, to be self-defeating.

> . . . releasing inhibitions is just as compulsive, repetitive and hysterical an operation as the repressing of them.

In an earlier oral culture, poetry and proverbs were easy memory forms for teaching, while writing and printing foster a logical, continuous, and planned "pursuit of knowledge." McLuhan defines "linear" understanding as that embodied in print, and "simultaneous" understanding as that given orally and pictorially by electronic media. Professor Frye sees both simply as differing mental operations in all media. The "linear" response is dependent upon the time taken to read or hear "the message." The "simultaneous" response is the real critical one, reacting to the total presentment. Books give a "spatial focus, a kind of projected total recall, to contain the experience." Oral "linear" communication, he implies, may go "in at one ear and out of the other" unless there is the written or printed record to make possible the critical, "simultaneous" response. This record is

> the model of all real teaching because . . . it repeats the same words however often one consults it . . . a repetition of the mind that underlies all genuine education.

Readers of a book form a community that naturally tends, sooner or later, to expand to the whole. The printed word creates not only technical efficiency, but all the freedoms:

> Democratic government, universal education, tolerance of dissent, and (because the book individualizes its audience) the sense of the importance of privacy, leisure and freedom of movement.

Oral and visual media thus do not supersede but supplement the printed word. Maurice Temple Smith also cogently develops the theme in the same issue, pointing out that neither

the cinema nor radio have diminished the importance of the printed word.

Can letters and the printed word be related to the ageless language of symbolism, understandable by the mind at different levels? Does oral expression echo faintly the language of *mantramic* sound, calling forth responses from human and animal emotions, both high and low? And the same with the language of colour and form? The whole nature must be evoked to respond. Further, what is taken in, learned or experienced, must be passed on if communication is to be complete.

In the first joint issue of *The New Era* (Journal of the World Education Fellowship) and *World Studies Education Quarterly Bulletin* (June 1970) Dr. J. L. Henderson writes of his recent lecture tour under the auspices of the British Council in Sierra Leone and Ghana. He refers with distress to the difficulties experienced there, and to the consequent low standard of education ("fact-sodden, examination-ridden") and with chastened respect and admiration to the small number of the population benefiting by full Secondary and even Tertiary education—"their intelligence, initiative and humourful endurance." *World Studies Bulletin* continues its usual interesting reports of how world-understanding is being educationally stimulated. *The New Era,* in both the June and July—August issues, features—since this is Unesco Education Year—articles on some of the pioneers in child education: Maria Montessori, Peter Petersen of Germany, inspirer of the Jena Plan, Freinet, the founder of the Mouvement de l'Ecole Moderne, Froebel, Dr. Decroly of Brussels, Comenius (with special reference to his ideas on pre-school education).

Education for "wholeness," with the teacher as guide and adjuster, and as a synthesis between individual freedom and community, relating school to life, are basic common denominators in these pioneers' viewpoints, no matter what variations there are in the working out.

Lady Bazley, Chairman of the Montessori Society, enunciates its principles—the child as a human being with unsuspected potentialities, the need for connection with reality, the mutual venture of learning, the awakening, from the age of seven, of moral sense and social awareness. There are specific Montessori techniques of learning, repudiating competition, and—as Brian Scott-Hughes indicates—the combination of example, responsibility, and (the minimum of) external discipline creates a stimulating and rewarding environment for all children alike.

Petersen, writes H. Raymond King, like other educationists, from Pestalozzi onwards, saw the whole life as "a life of education" extending beyond educational institutions to bring in the whole community. Theory, research, and practice are synthesized. Conventional class groups are superseded by the "family group" of children of different ages and abilities, supplemented by flexible subsidiary groupings for special purposes (sometimes including parents), free in character, and allowing each pupil to search for his or her true vocation. Freedom is always within the group order. The Jena Plan emphasizes true-to-life "situations" as starting points for learning. Freinet also built on the children's powerful interest in the world around them. Michel Betrand sees *l'Ecole Moderne* as a child-centred *working* school, based on experimental research and teaching through co-operation.

Co-operation, and handling and exploring things, characterize Froebel's method also. Dr. Evelyn Lawrence brings out his particular contributions—the idea of "play" as not separate from "work," and his essentially religious attitude to education (not orthodox religion, however). The harmony

and wonder of the universe, of which man is a free-willed part, are the "order" of God. The Decroly School also stresses the interaction between school and society, the constant contact with real life." Concern with events and facts, "social, scientific, artistic or simply human" is reflected in its activities, says Denise Michel. Knowledge, translated into activity in school life, should prepare for an active part in the world-to-be.

But whether religious or humanistic in tone, all these educational endeavours are helping to break down the old bad system, "fact-sodden, examination-ridden," with its spirit of selfish competition; and they are welcome indeed.

The distinguished anthropologist, Margaret Mead, has put forward the provocative suggestion that the perennial gap between older and younger generations has become fixed, owing to the recent vast expansion of scientific knowledge, the increase in technological power, the growing interdependence of all human communities. In an extract from her coming book *Culture and Commitment* (*Times Saturday Review*, 8 August 1970) she claims that the experience and skills gathered by adults—either in the earlier world of their time, or during the period of these immense changes in all directions—are no longer valid when that world has become an "electronically based, intercommunicating net-work" through which the younger generations of all nations share in a "planetary and universal" experience, and look at life with a wider vision:

> In their eyes the killing of an enemy is not qualitatively different from the murder of a neighbour... Old distinctions between peacetime and wartime, friend and foe, "my" group and "theirs"—the outsiders, the aliens —have lost their meaning. They know that the people of one nation alone cannot save their own children; each holds the responsibility for the other's children. Although I have said *they know* these things, perhaps I should say that this is *how they feel.*

To illustrate her point she uses a moving essay by a fifteen-years-old Texan boy:

> We see the world as a huge rumble as it swiftly goes by with wars, poverty, prejudice, and the lack of understanding among people and nations.... My generation is being used almost like a machine. We are to learn set standards, strive for better education so we can follow in our elder's footsteps. But why? If we are to be a generation of repetition, the situation will be worse. But how shall we change? We need a great deal of love for everyone, we need a universal understanding among people, we need to think of ourselves and to express our feelings, but that is not all. I have yet to discover what else we need, nor have I practised these things as fully as I should. Because when I try I'm sneered at by my elders and those who do not hear, or look at it with a closed mind.... I admit we should follow some basic rules but first we should look at who is making the rules... The answer is out there somewhere. We need to search for it.

Dr. Mead argues that, in the past, adults could act as guides from having "grown up in a cultural system," But that today there are no guides in the world of flux, when

> the sources of energy, the means of communication, the certainties of a known world, the limits of the explorable universe, the definition of humanity, and the fundamental imperatives of life and death have changed.

This may be too sweeping. Man is not simply a "cultural animal," as Professor Fox calls him in the July 1970 issue of *Encounter*, and there *are* fundamental and unchanging realities and values out-lasting all cultural changes, just as the synthesis of wisdom reaches beyond the aggregations of knowledge. It may be that in each generation only a few have glimpsed them—save in a glass darkly —but with the present break-away from the old separative concepts and materialistic aims, we may be at the turning point of hope for the future.

To the young Texan and others like him, one might quote the *Bhagavad-Gita*:

> Seek this wisdom by doing service, by strong search, by questions, and by humility; the wise who see the truth will communicate it unto thee, and knowing which thou shalt never again fall into error.

But "the wise," it should be noted, are not just "the elders of the tribe" with their specific culture.

Campaigns for "population control" through contraceptive and sterilization programmes have featured, with all the emotive means at their command, the dire threat of world famine through the "population explosion." From time to time authoritative bodies put out facts and figures which give little support to such claims and forebodings. But the facts need to be repeated again and again before there seems any hope of making any impact on a public conditioned by mass media. Problems are not static and absolute. The bogey now for the developing countries is not lack of food but unemployment. This was put forward by the deputy director of the World Food and Agricultural Organization at the U.N. Economic and Social Council, at Geneva (The *Guardian*, 9 July 1970). It is now considered that technical improvements in plant-breeding and the introduction of high-yielding cereals will make it possible to grow enough to satisfy world food needs. The present problem in the underdeveloped countries is that there appears to be insufficient work, either on the land or in the cities.

It should be noted that the introduction of sophisticated Western technology, with its tendency to eliminate man-power, has harmed communities that would have benefited by the simpler "intermediate" technology suited to their needs and capacities, and depending on man-power. Surely this problem is as capable of solution as that of food-production?

As regards population, the highly charged word "explosion" has sadly distorted the situation. A reader of *The Guardian* has protested to the Editor (14 July 1970) about its use by the planning correspondent. He points out that in England and Wales during the past ten years, there is a normal cycle of 11 per cent increase in the number of births, from 1959 to 1964, and 10 per cent decrease from 1964 to 1969. Further, in the same period, the number of deaths has increased by an average of 5,000 a year. He cites also the fact that net emigration from this country during the past five years has averaged 40,000. Incidentally, the flow of immigrants into the U.K., about which there was such an outcry in some quarters, has slackened.

The real problems are not of an overcrowded population, of famine, of unemployment. They are problems of maldistribution of people and of food, of lack of imagination and diagnostic failures, and of separative attitudes, all of them stemming fundamentally from ignorance and self-centredness. This is where education for world fellowship—based on the recognition of the spiritual unity of all living beings—is so badly needed.

The words "yoga," "meditation," "mysticism," have an increasing fascination today, not only for genuine seekers for some "path of purpose," but also for escapists and curiosity-mongers, hankering after unfamiliar thrills and powers. Scientists have hitherto remained aloof. Now Dr. John Clark, Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Manchester University in "A Programme for Patanjali" (*New Society*, 23 July 1970)—i.e., a computer programme—states: "I take Yoga seriously as an important field of scientific research." A "flow-diagram" of the successive stages of meditation

has been worked out and the computer fed with an informal contents-analysis of mystical anthologies and classics like the *Bhagavad-Gita* and *Patanjali Yoga Aphorisms*. The few ideas considered as basic by Dr. Clark "certainty, knowledge, unity, eternity, light, joy, freedom" have been expanded by "simple literary devices" to cover a range of significance. Such computer techniques, he feels, can help to integrate the evidence from mystical literature into "the topography of the inner world." Other doors lead into the mental labyrinth, the doors of hypnotism, mental illness, drugs, and sleep. He includes among its guides Lao-Tze and Plotinus, Mesmer and Freud, Jung and James Joyce, Hermann Hesse and J. L. Borges, but concludes that the exploration of this inner world is only just beginning.

Another article, by Carol Dix (*The Guardian*, 21 August 1970) describes some of Dr. Clark's experiments with "computer mysticism." The computer Saint 505 was programmed with a vocabulary from mystical religions and "taught to pray" (the basic concepts now being evaluated as five—"Joy, light, knowledge, certainty, unity"). Examples of the programmed computer's random selections are:

> The omnipotence of awareness is the creation of existence.
> The joy of identity is the freedom of infinity.
> The ecstasy of omnipotence is the pleasure of desire.

But surely these galimaufries, limited by the information and vocabulary fed into the computer, are more akin to crossword ingenuity than to living spiritual ideas? Dr. Clark and his fellow experimenters can be praised for their open-minded interest, but "the Kingly Yoga" cannot be grasped by methods that trivialize it. To speak also of this inner-world exploration as only just beginning is to ignore all the wealth of Eastern writings on the subject. There are no grounds for assuming that there is only this world and the other, and that the doors opened by hypnotism, drugs, etc., open on to the same terrain as that of Plotinus. All ancient researchers referred to three levels of experience—bodily, psychic, and spiritual—often subdivided in many ways. The psychic and the spiritual should not be confused. Finally, in choosing basic ideas from the *Bhagavad-Gita,* how did the theme of *Dharma* (duty), that runs throughout, get overlooked?

> Therefore perform thou that which thou hast to do, at all times unmindful of the event; for the man who doeth that which he hath to do, without attachment to the result, obtaineth the Supreme.

This ideal of *Dharma,* of altruism, of brotherhood, is explicit or implicit in all spiritual literature that delineates "the Way." The concepts fed to Dr. Clark's computer, taken by themselves, could well describe "the Open Path" —the absorption of the individual self in the All, eliminating all possibility of helping other selves, the path of spiritual selfishness. he Northern Buddhist classic *The Voice of the Silence* sums up the starting-point of real Yoga: "To live to benefit mankind is the first step."

The British Society for Social Responsibility in Science, inaugurated last year, is planning to campaign more forcefully. Students are independently taking a hand. Anthony Tucker, Science Correspondent (*The Guardian*, 21 July 1970) writes about an international conference, "The Threats and Promises of Science," at Imperial College, London, organized by an international youth committee. The findings of working groups on such subjects as population, abuse of world resources and the natural environment, mass armaments and depersonalization of the individual, will eventually be published.

> There is no doubt that the conference reflects very deep concern about the validity

of assumptions normally taken for granted in the "progress" for science and technology.

In fact one speaker, Peter Harper, a graduate in experimental biochemistry, using rats for the transfer of memory through brain extract, has thrown up his career and research in fear and horror at what is happening in the scientific world. A noted figure who earlier rejected biological research is Dr. James Shapiro, whose group in U.S.A. raised the question of genetic engineering by its pioneer work in isolating a single gene. Mr. Tucker considers that the argument "the rejection of new knowledge will lead to stagnation" does not fully meet the situation. The pace of research in some fields is too fast for society to be able to realize the implications and repercussions, and such concern is natural.

The March 1970 "Ends and Sayings" reported the five-year non-violent campaign being waged against big business in agriculture, under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, on behalf of the appallingly exploited migrant fruit-pickers in California.

Logically the California Grape Strike by Mexican Americans, and the initiation of a nation-wide California grape boycott, might have seemed a forlorn hope. Starting with no funds, and with Chavez himself ill much of the time, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee was pitted against all the might of the wealthy growers' organization, supported by "oil companies, banks, and the Administration. The Pentagon's contribution was to treble, then quadruple its orders for grapes for the armed forces." (*The Observer*, 19 July 1970). Yet, despite all this, public opinion has now forced the leading grape-growers to come to the point of signing a union contract with the workers, and the American Federation of Labor—Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL—CIO) has been "shamed" into making a large donation to U.F.W.C.'s fighting fund. Though this fight for justice and humanity is far from finished, nevertheless this first moral victory over Mammon brings hope for the future.

Summing up in the broadest possible way the characteristics of the religious life, as we have found them, it includes the following beliefs:

1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance.

2. That union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end.

3. That prayer or inner communion with the Spirit thereof—be that Spirit "God" or "Law"—is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world.

—WILLIAM JAMES

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

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